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En Metaph. Z17, Aristóteles toma un nuevo punto de 
partida (1041a6) en su discusión sobre la sustancia: la 
forma sustancial es principio y causa (1041a6-10, 
1041b8), mientras que la materia es un elemento 
(1041b31) de las sustancias materiales. Además, un 
compromiso de Aristóteles, quizá no totalmente acla-
rado en Z17, es que las sustancias materiales son todos 
unificados (1041b11-12). Éstas son dos tesis centrales 
de Z17, cuya aparente ausencia en el resumen de H1 
(1042a3-23) ha despertado dudas entre los comentado-
res acerca del mismo proyecto de H; un libro que es 
visto comúnmente como un mero manojo de notas so-
bre temas de Z. En cuanto a la contribución positiva 
de H, los comentadores destacan poco más que la in-
troducción del vocabulario modal de potencia y acto, 
en el cual se habría traducido la distinción de Z entre 
materia y forma; y encuentran recién en la solución 
que H6 (1045a23-25, 1045b18-19) ofrece al problema de 
la unidad la genuina contribución que hace el entero 
libro H. Como consecuencia de esta lectura, H1-5 que-
dan a la sombra de H6 y resultan escasamente atendi-
dos. En contra de la tendencia todavía predominante a 
no considerar H1-5 en sí mismos, en este artículo in-
tentaré mostrar que esos capítulos desarrollan un pro-
grama que prepara adecuadamente la conclusión de 
H6. H2-3 son la primera gran estación en ese progra-
ma; allí Aristóteles justifica la prioridad de la forma; 
posteriormente, en H4-5 hace algo similar con la uni-
dad de los compuestos materiales. De tal manera, tra-
taré de mostrar que H1-5 constituyen una pieza cen-
tral en el acabamiento de la teoría sobre la sustancia 
material iniciada en Z17.  
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ABSTRACT 
 
In Metaph. Z17, Aristotle makes a fresh start (1041a6) 
in his discussion on substance. Accordingly, the sub-
stantial form is principle and cause (1041a6-10, 
1041b8), whereas the matter is element (1041b31) of 
material substances. Besides, Aristotle assumes (prob-
ably without justifying in Z17) that material sub-
stances are unified wholes (1041b11-12). These are two 
main theses in Z17 whose apparent absence in the 
summary of H1 (1042a3-23) has raised doubts among 
commentators as to the very project of H a book 
commonly held to be a bunch of notes on Z. Regarding 
H’s positive results, commentators mostly focus on 
the introduction of the modal vocabulary of potential-
ity and actuality into which Z’s distinction between 
matter and form is translated. So they find book’s H 
proper contribution only in H6’s solution to the prob-
lem of unity (1045a23-25, 1045b18-19). As a conse-
quence of this reading, H1-5 remain overshadowed by 
H6, and therefore they are often neglected. Contrarily 
to this still predominant trend towards not taking H1-
5 on their own, I will here try to show that these chap-
ters develop a program, in which H6’s conclusion is 
properly prepared. Stations of this program are H2-3, 
where Aristotle justifies the priority of form, and then 
H4-5, where he does the same for the unity of material 
compounds. So, I aim to show that H1-5 are a center-
piece in the completion and fulfilment of Z17’s theory 
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1. THE “EVOLUTION” OF MATERIAL SUBSTANCE IN METAPHYSICS 
ZH 
Let us imagine for a moment that it is possible to consider the Aristotelian sub-
stance similarly to the way evolutionists consider natural kinds. We could, then, 
ask questions about the “evolution” of material substance. This attitude would 
enable us to interpret Metaphysics ZH where the “evolution” I want to consider 
takes place in terms of the “development” of the philosophical argument 
launched in Z17 and continued in the following book H. So we could try to 
single out the program that takes shape along these books. On the contrary, if 
we believe we could read ZH and get by without the hypothesis of a program 
which is, for the moment, a merely heuristic assumption, then ZH’s claims 
could be seen as theoretically isolated developments deprived of any inner con-
nection, or even as fragments or pieces of an argument with no clear objective. 
On the contrary, the approach I propose here to undertake will enable us to ask 
the following questions: how did Aristotelian substance “evolve” between Z17 
and H6?; which were the specific features of substance in both stages of this 
“evolution”?; how do we have to describe the “development” of this “evolu-
tion”?; which exactly is its starting point, which is its arrival point, and which 
are its halfway points?; was perhaps this sort of “evolution” a linear process or 
were there several detours and truncated “developments” along these chapters 
that could have given rise to other “species”? It is quite obvious that these are 
not questions about the purported author’s “evolution.” By raising these ques-
tions, we do not make any assumption from the start as to whether Aristotle 
firmly upheld one coherent thesis from Z17 to H6, or he rather changed his 
mind along these chapters. Whether or not the author had a preconceived plan 
when writing on substance between Z and H is not a question I am interested 
in raising here. For that reason, I will leave aside any speculation about possible 
double versions of some chapters of Z as well as any discussion about the rela-
tive dating of Z and H. So I will put aside considerations as to whether Aristotle 
tried to reformulate Z after having achieved some new views on material sub-
stance in H.2 On the contrary and this is certainly not an uncontroversial 
hypothesis on these books, I will here take ZH as they stand, i.e. I will consider 
them as if they were “evolutionary” terminals of a successful argumentative 
process. I am interested in finding out both the main features of this “species” 
called material substance that became steady between Z17 and H6 and the 
-------------------------------------------- 
2 For a similar approach on Metaph. ZH see Devereux 2003. 
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“evolutionary” way that enabled material substance to finally reach that 
position. 
The famous paleontologist Stephen Jay Gould once claimed that while 
nature’s message lies in its generality, nature’s beauty lies in the details.3 This 
inspiring claim could help us to examine (mutatis mutandis) Z17-H6’s argu-
ment. It seems possible to assume the heuristic hypothesis that these chapters 
contain the “evolution” of material substance, and that they draw some linear 
argument, which, however, is not to be seen as lacking any halfway 
complexities. But, despite the latter, such a linear argument may have launched 
some program about the material substance. One outstanding feature of this 
linear development I would like to suggest is that, if we focus exclusively on 
H6’s general message without paying attention to the argumentative details 
deployed in the intermediate chapters, we cannot really understand the entire 
argument of Z17-H6. Under this hypothesis, H6’s consecrated seat of honor as 
to the metaphysical message of these books will remain undisputed since we 
will still recognize H6’s achievements as to the solution of the unity of material 
substance by means of the modal notions of potentiality and actuality this is 
the homo sapiens of our history. However, my claim is that, in order to fully 
understand this message, it is necessary to dig into the details of H1-5 to find 
out the very argumentative support that could ground the meaning of that 
message and that give H6’s solution its proper conceptual soundness and 
acceptability. 
But this (loose) comparison between Paleontology and Zetology (or rather 
Etology) should be clearer now. Here I am neither suggesting that Z17 presents 
a “species” different from that found in H6 nor that H1-5 could be seen as being 
developmentally independent from H6’s terminal. What I am proposing is 
rather that Z17’s main innovation i.e. the thesis that substantial form is cause 
is on the same “phylogenic line” of H6, and further that Z17 relates to H6’s main 
claim i.e. that form and matter constitute a strong unity since form actualizes 
the compound’s proximate matter similarly to what paleontologists claim 
about the homo erectus as to the development of intellectual capacities in the 
sapiens. In my picture, form as cause the homo erectus of Z17 results in the 
unity of composite substances that are wholes rather than mere heaps or sums 
of parts in H6. This feature, which is already developed in Z17, is crucially 
refined along H’s chapters until establishing a successful explanation of the 
compound’s unity in H6 this is where we find the homo sapiens in this 
-------------------------------------------- 
3 Gould 1989 makes this claim about the importance that some invertebrates founded in 
Burgess Shale would have for the history of evolution. Among Gould’s predecessors in 
celebrating the details of nature see Aristotle, PA I 5, 645a15-17: “Therefore we must avoid a 
childish distaste for examining the less valued animals. For in all natural things there is 
something wonderful” (Balme’s translation). 
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“evolutionary” history. In H6, Aristotle solves indeed the problem of unity be-
tween the potential matter and the actual form of a compound (1045a23-25, b18-
22). But this explanation can be only reached over the course of the arguments 
deployed in H1-5. This is the Aristotelian history of material substance between 
Z17 and H6 that I would like to tell here.4 
Before briefly considering the two terminals of this history in Z17 and H6, 
and before examining in detail the transition between H1 and H5, it might be 
convenient to make a short remark on the current state of the art about book 
H. There are still great discrepancies among scholars as to the role and im-
portance of H1-5 within ZH’s argument. Until recent years, H1-5 remained 
overshadowed by the big foliage of the justly celebrated chapters (i.e. Z17 and 
H6) that frame H1-5. My aim here is to describe the “evolutionary” intermediate 
stages in which material substance is between Z17 and H6, and, further, to make 
it make plausible that H6 is the completion and fulfillment of Z17’s argument, 
which is only reached by means of H1-5. Therefore, I think that the following 
caveat should be repeated: it could happen that without paying sufficient atten-
tion to the “evolution” of the argument that ends up in H6 we may lose sight of 
the very difficulties to which H6’s responses are solutions. So I suggest that 
only by a careful reading of H1-5 we will be in a position to better understand 
how H6’s brief response to the problem of unity is elaborated. H6’s solution is 
intentionally presented by Aristotle in a quite easy way; he simply claims that, 
once we have avoided some false assumptions about form and matter mainly 
that they are two independent items, the problem about the compound’s unity 
no longer exists: 
 
However, if, as we say, on the one hand there is matter and on the 
other hand there is form, and one is potentially while the other is 
actually, what we inquire will no longer seem to be a difficulty. (H6, 
1045a23-25)5 
 
Yet, this triumphant solution cannot be fully understood without the back-
ground of H1-5.  
-------------------------------------------- 
4 Morel 2015 suggests that H refines (without replacing) the hylomorphism of Z by means 
of the modal concepts of potentiality and actuality. This involves, according to him, a 
rehabilitation of the material subject as substance which, in turn, is only possible when the 
material subject becomes a determinate part of the compound. This last question involves an 
interpretation of Z3’s indeterminate substrate which could not be substance, according to 
Aristotle (1029a27) and its possible relation to the modal conception of matter in H4-5. I briefly 
discuss this topic here below. 
5 I quote Jaeger’s text in OCT (1957). These versions are my own translations based on 
Ross 1924 and Bostock 1994. Angle brackets mark additions in the translation. 
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At this point, it should be quite plain that my approach to H does not 
share the once popular anti-linear view defended by commentators such as 
Ross,6 Bostock,7 and to some extent the Londinensis,8 for whom, generally 
speaking, book H is a miscellany of notes about several topics raised in Z. I 
rather tend to share the view of more recent authors such as Burnyeat,9 Gill,10 
Detel,11 and Morel,12 who endorse two main claims on H. On the one hand, they 
suggest that H6 is where Z17’s new starting point is fully developed;13 but on 
the other hand, they also hold the view that H1-5 are a centerpiece of H6’s so-
lution, and so they urge to integrate these intermediate chapters within the full 
story told in H.14 
 
2. METAPHYSICS Z17 IN THE “PHYLOGENETIC TREE” OF H 
In Z17 Aristotle takes another starting point (ἄλλην οἷον ἀρχὴν, 1041a7) in his 
discussion on substance. Accordingly, the substance is principle and cause 
-------------------------------------------- 
6 Ross 1924. 
7 Bostock 1994. 
8 Burnyeat 1984. 
9 Burnyeat 2001. 
10 Gill 1996. 
11 Detel 2009. 
12 Morel 2015. 
13 This is not to say, however, that these authors think that the story told by Aristotle in 
ZH comes to an end in H6; particularly Gill 1989 emphasizes that Aristotle’s solution to the 
problem of unity is only reached in Θ7.  
14 Burnyeat 2001, 71 claims: “H6 is the crowning moment of ZH, where the reworking 
of form and matter in terms of actuality and potentiality at last makes it possible to solve the 
big problem left over from Z11, the unity of definition…” See also Gill 1996, 209: “[…] there is a 
pressing need for an investigation of H1-5 in their own right. What is the Project of these largely 
neglected chapters? How do they relate to the argument of Z and prepare the way for H6?” 
Another common way to read H is to consider H6 in its relation to Z12, and to discuss whether 
the solution to the problem of unity is valid both for definitions and material compounds (so do 
Steinfath 1996, Loux 1995, and Gill 2010). Two important works that illustrate the rather one-
sided focus on H6 are Gill 1989, 138ff and Harte 1996. The influential commentary on Z by Frede 
and Patzig 1988 took Z’s argument as self-contained and as having an end in Z17. This is still 
the view in several books (Wedin 2000, Angioni 2008, and Lewis 2013), but see the opposite 
view in Loux 1991. Frede 1994 saw H mainly as a preparation for the next discussion on separate 
substance in Λ7 and Λ9. For a very useful discussion on Zetology see Galluzzo 2006. The 
(ongoing) turning point in the investigation on H took place in the present century by means 
of some books and commentaries. See, for instance, Burnyeat 2001 (who presents a brief 
commentary on H, in which he rehabilitates H as the place in which Z’s theory reaches its 
fulfillment). Detel 2009 and Morel 2015 comment extensively on H. Morel 2015, 7-12 mentions 
current perspectives on H. Important ongoing contributions on H include some (to my 
knowledge, still unpublished) presentations of Code, and papers (some of them also 
unpublished) by Seminara 2014 and Seminara 2018, Pfeiffer 2016 (who particularly highlights 
the program of H), Rapp 2018. (I warmly thank these colleagues for kindly having sent me and 
discussed their works on H). Two further contributions on H5 and H6 were recently published 
in the same volume of Elenchos; see Baghdassarian 2014 and Delcomminette 2014. As for many 
other topics in the Metaphysics, Menn’s still unpublished book is an important contribution to 
the discussion of ZH (see Menn, IIe). 
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(1041a6-10). This is a new role for form (1041b8). Matter is, on the contrary, an 
element (1041b31) of the sensible substance. An important subsidiary thesis of 
Z17 is that hylomorphic compounds are genuine units even though they are 
not immediate units like the very simple things (1041b9-10) rather than mere 
heaps (1041b11-12).15 The form is the cause of the compound’s unity, and it is 
joined to the matter.16 Aristotle disentangles the metaphysical structure of com-
pounds by applying the why question to them. Compounds only seem to be 
simple things; yet, by considering them more closely, they are disclosed to show 
their very complex structure as made of a form that is predicated of a matter 
(see also H2, 1043a5-6). A further main assumption of Z17 is that form is irre-
ducible to matter this is what Aristotle tries to argue for in the final section of 
Z17 (1041b19ff).17 For Aristotle in Z17, thus, form is prior and is the primary 
-------------------------------------------- 
15 The immediate units are probably the forms they are referred as essence and 
substance in these same lines. See Ross 1924, II ad loc., and Burnyeat 2001, 60. In 1041b9-10, 
Aristotle detaches compound things about which one has to look for the why and the cause 
(1041a27-28, b5) from immediate units about which there is not inquiry, or one has to inquire 
in a different way. For a similar contrast see H6, 1045a36-b10. The phrase ἕτερος τρόπος τῆς 
ζητήσεως in 1041b10 is commonly translated as “in a different way” (so does Ross, similarly 
Burnyeat, Frede and Patzig) or “some method other than inquiry” (Bostock). Yu 1997, 132fn. 16 
considers possible translations of this phrase as well as their consequences. The general thesis 
that simple things are indemonstrable is a main theorem drawn from Posterior Analytics (I 2-3), 
whose general distinctions about inquiry and demonstration (see also APo. II 1-2, 7-10) Aristotle 
applies to hylomorphic compounds in Z17. Burnyeat 2001 makes the suggestive remark that 
the term “form” is absent from Z17. However, expressions for essence like that of 1041b6 clearly 
make reference to the form; the nature and the substance (1041b27) of each thing are also 
references to it. On the contrary, as commentators unanimously remark (e.g. Morel 2015, 12, 
23, 39 et passim), the modal vocabulary of potentiality and actuality introduced for the first 
time at H1, 1042a28 remains absent from Z17. 
16 On problems about this double unity i.e. the unity of a compound and the unity of 
form and matter see Lewis 1996. 
17 The expression “another starting point” (ἄλλην οἷον ἀρχὴν, 1041a6), by means of 
which Aristotle signalizes his new approach on form as cause in Z17, might lead us to believe 
that the entire discussion of the previous sixteen chapters is throw away at one stroke. This is 
not the place to discuss the controversial relation between Z17 and Z1-16, but one should be 
aware of the quite obvious fact that whatever one thinks about it will have an impact on the 
significance held by the new approach to substance launched in Z17; and, in particular, it will 
have an impact on the meaning we think the thesis of form as cause has in relation to both Z17 
and H. Let me make here just a few suggestions on the controversial relationship between Z17 
and Z’s previous chapters. One may think that Z17 reintroduces the candidate for substance 
already examined in Z4, i.e. essence, but it does so within the hylomorphic framework (provided 
by Z7-9). Accordingly, what is to be a house explains (i.e. it is the cause of) that certain materials 
constitute a compound of some sort. Such an approach to ZH would not limit, of course, book 
H to be a development of Z17’s argument only (as, for instance, it is suggested by Gill 2006, 361; 
she claims indeed that the four candidates for substance examined in Z3-16 are plainly rejected 
in Z17). This approach would rather address (at least) some chapters of book Z as having a 
positive impact on H’s discussion. As Detel 2009, 558 fn. 138 remarks, such a view fits better 
with the fact that H1’s summary records the entire book Z (with gaps). In this reconstruction 
of Z, one may put in brackets for a moment whether the chapters Z7-9 originally belong to book 
Z or they are rather as commentators mostly think later additions. The important thing is, 
however, whether Z7-9 help or not to move forward Aristotle’s discussion in Z I suggest, they 
do. The aporematic reading of Z (Z1-16) was favored by Code 1984, who suggests that Z is a 
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object of the causal inquiry. However, there is an interesting passage in which 
Aristotle binds the causal inquiry, which seems to point exclusively to form as 
cause, to the matter. This could give us an idea of the intertwining between 
form and matter in causal inquiry: 
 
[…] For instance, why are these <materials> in that state a house? 
Because that which was to be a house belongs <to them> […] Thus 
what is sought is the cause of the matter, i.e. the form by which 
<the matter> is some sort of thing; and that is the substance <of the 
thing>. (1041b6-9) 
 
Let us now take a quick look at the explanatory model of the Analytics with 
which Aristotle works in Z17. In standard scientific explanations, one starts 
from a knowledge of the fact for instance, that it thunders (or that some phe-
nomenon is a thunder); hereafter, one asks for the cause of the fact it is sug-
gested, then, that the cause of that noise in the clouds is the extinction of fire. 
This is the general model applied by Aristotle in 1041b21ff: one knows that this 
is a human being or a house, and hereafter one tries to analyze causally the 
structure of these phenomena (1041b3) in that one seeks which is the cause of 
certain materials making a compound of some sort. At first glance, Aristotle’s 
answer is quite obvious: inasmuch as the essence organizes or determines some 
matter, it is the cause of this thing here being something of some sort for in-
stance, the essence of a house is the cause that these bricks and stones constitute 
a concrete house (1041b1-8). The explanatory syllogism in Barbara with which 
Aristotle works out metaphysical explanations in Z17 could be reconstructed as 
follows:18 
 
P1 Being a house belongs to the structure that is defined as protec-
tive building of humans and their properties; 
P2 the structure defined as protective building for humans and their 
properties (i.e. what is to be a house) belongs to these bricks and 
stones arranged in a certain way; therefore 
C being a house belongs to these bricks and stones arranged in a 
certain way.  
-------------------------------------------- 
much more detailed (than book M) examination of the twelfth aporia presented in B, i.e. the 
difficulty about whether the principles (or the primary substance) are universals or rather 
particulars. More precisely, according to Code Aristotle endorses the view that the principles 
and the primary substance (of sensible substances), i.e. the forms, must satisfy two conditions: 
the condition of determination and of particularity which are proper to a tode ti as well as 
the condition of definability that is proper to a ti esti. Also Gill 1989 takes Z as an aporematic 
book, but she grounds this view on the unsolved problem of the unity of composite substances 
her main claim is that matter’s independent contribution makes unity impossible in Z. 
18 For the application of the explanatory model drawn from the Analytics to Z17’s 
hylomorphic structures see Wedin 2000, 414ff; and for the reconstruction of the metaphysical 
syllogism, see Detel 2009, 538f. I thank Christian Pfeiffer for discussions on this topic. 
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A possible interpretation of this syllogism claims that the first premise (P1) ex-
presses the definition of house provided by the specific form (or P1 conveys 
what is to be a house); the conclusion (C) conveys the specification of the thing 
(“this thing or this stuff is a house”), which is obtained by means of the meta-
physical predication of form to matter, which is expressed, in turn, in the crucial 
second premise (P2). As a result, in P1 there is a definition, in P2 there is the 
metaphysical determination by means of the predication of form to matter (met-
aphysical explanation that conveys the clue for the causal relation), and in C we 
get the classification of the compound by means of the explanation of the matter 
as constituent (bricks and stones are, i.e. constitute a house, and therefore this 
thing or this stuff here is (classified as) a house). So by means of an in depth 
analysis of the structure of the fact (i.e. an analysis of the thing that is called 
house), we can explain why this is a house: this thing here is a house (compound) 
because that specific arrangement (form) of bricks and stones (matter) makes 
these stuffs fit to accomplish the function defined by the essence. 
Several difficulties are concealed in this syllogism. For instance, the syl-
logism does not clear up the following dilemma: either (a) form and matter are 
two mutually independent components at the same level but if it is so, then 
the compound’s purported unity will be a problem, and, further, the compound 
will be something superimposed on its two components or (b) the compound 
is nothing but its form but if it is so, then the matter will be redundant and the 
purported material feature of the sensible compound will be left unexplained. 
There is a possible answer to the first horn of this dilemma; it claims that form 
and matter are the same thing. However, if one endorses this solution, then one 
cannot really get a compound, but an entity made up of only one component 
i.e. its form, and this will bring one back, lastly, to the problem disclosed in 
the second horn of the dilemma i.e. that matter is redundant. Whatever horn 
we choose to work out a possible solution, we seem to remain trapped in a 
dilemma: either we create the compound as a sort of third entity above the two 
components that remain mutually independent according to (a) or we are 
forced to give up the composition of hylomorphic entities by reducing them to 
their corresponding forms according to (b). 
These are precisely the difficulties book H aims to solve, as I will suggest. 
Beyond further problems involved in this syllogism, one should notice that at 
some point in Z17 Aristotle’s argument is based on a crucial assumption that is 
left unjustified, since he takes for granted that the material parts of a compound 
make up a unified whole (1041b11-12). We do not find in the rest of the chapter 
(1041b11-33) any defense of this claim. Aristotle devotes the last section Z17 to 
maintain that form is irreducible to matter (and compound); yet, the unity as-
sumption remains there unexamined. 
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The way in which Aristotle gives support to the thesis of the irreducibility 
(and priority) of form in Z17 involves a reductio argument (1041b19-25), in 
which he holds that, unlike mere heaps, wholes do not dissolve together with 
the corruption of their parts (1041b14-16). This is striking, because heaps are 
Aristotle’s favorite example for mere sums that lack a genuine unity. So the two 
claims i.e. (1) the priority of form, for which Aristotle presents an argument 
in Z17, and (2) the unity of compounds, which is left unjustified seem to be 
the front and back of Z17’s bill. In his argument for the priority of form, 
Aristotle purports to show that wholes behave similar to syllables, in that they 
are something different from their parts or elements (1041b16-17). But still, the 
argument relies too much on intuition, since it is assumed that after the 
decomposition of heaps their parts remain in the same state they were before 
entering composition, whereas the parts of a whole, when the whole is 
destroyed, cannot survive as they were before. The reason for this dissimilarity 
would be that the nature of a whole requires that its parts must be radically 
modified just for performing the role they have to perform if they become parts 
integrated into the whole’s functioning. On the basis of a similar reasoning 
Aristotle infers that any whole cannot be reduced to their elements or parts, in 
that we cannot give an account of what the whole is (i.e. its form) by mentioning 
the elements. Thus, by assuming that a whole must be something different from 
its parts, Aristotle endorses the view that what makes a whole what it really is 
cannot be either (a) one further part of it, or (b) something that is made up of 
several parts or elements (1041b19-33). 
To sum up, there are two unjustified assumptions in Z17: 
(1) Aristotle claims that the form is something different from the material 
parts, but this seems to imply that it is different from the whole too. He merely 
suggested that the form is the cause of the arrangement of the materials that 
constitute the whole. At most, this is an argument to distinguish the form from 
the elements, but it is not enough to distinguish the form from the whole.19 
(2) He assumes, but does not explain, the distinction between the parts of 
a whole and the parts of a heap. This is certainly a crucial assumption in Aris-
totle’s argument, since his claim that wholes are units, and so that they are not 
like heaps, relies precisely on that assumption. 
It would be wrong to assume that these issues ceased to interest Aristotle 
after having completed Z17. In the following section I will suggest that he con-
tinues dealing with them in H, and more precisely that in H6 he comes up with 
a remarkably economic and plausible justification of the two controversial as-
sumptions he left unjustified in Z17, i.e. that (1) the form as cause is something 
-------------------------------------------- 
19 Some interpreters hold that there is only a linguistic distinction between the form and 
the whole or the arrangement of materials. This is, however, a view I do not see reasons for 
accepting it. 
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different from the compound and its material parts, and that (2) the material 
elements of a hylomorphic compound are tightly-fitted so that they make up a 
unified whole. Yet, the argumentative support for H6’s compact solution is not 
in that chapter but in H1-5, to which we have to come back for arguments. More 
precisely, H2-3 justify the priority of form, and H4-5 do the same for the unity 
of the material compound. Before going back to examine these two duets (to-
gether with the summary of Z in H1), let me briefly describe the finished shape 
taken by the Aristotelian material substance in H6, whose message can serves 
us as a guide to go into the examination of the detailed arguments of H1-5. 
 
3. H6’S SPECIFYING MODEL 
Given the short and compact expression of the way out of the problem of unity 
in H6 (1045a23-25), the suggestion that the argumentative support of that cele-
brated solution can be found in H1-5 only, may have some plausibility. H6 has 
plenty of allusions to previous discussions,20 and when it comes to convey its 
position, this pops up with no proper preparation; Aristotle’s positive claims 
are merely framed by a criticism against Platonic assumptions on substance and 
composition (1045a16, b4ff).21 
In 1045a7-22, Aristotle begins H6 by assessing the unity question in terms 
that clearly refer to Z12 and H3 (unity of definition and the parallel unity of 
number). Furthermore, it repeats the distinction between wholes and heaps first 
introduced in Z17. This is an important reference, since, taken together with 
the mention of the cause of unity for bodies (1045a11), it extends the question 
about unity from definitions to material substances and leads me to suppose 
that Aristotle works with one single model to explain both compositions. In the 
second section of H6 (1045a23-35), Aristotle contrasts his own position about 
unity to other Platonic-style alternative explanations (1045a16-22) which are 
likely to fail because they take the parts of compounds to be independent and 
complete things. This problem takes us back to Z13, where Aristotle denies that 
a substance can be a unit if it is composed of other actual existing substances 
(1039a3-14). In the next section (1045a36-b10), Aristotle compares unified 
-------------------------------------------- 
20 For instance, 1045a9-10 refers back to Z17’s treatment of parts and wholes/heaps; 
1045a13-14 involves a further reference to Z4’s discussion about the object of definition 
(essence) and the unity of it; this is followed by an allusion to Z12’s examination of the unity 
of definition in 1045a18-20. 
21 See the Platonic vocabulary in 1045a18 (κατὰ μέθεξιν) and in 1045b7-9 (διὰ ταύτην δὲ 
τὴν ἀπορίαν οἱ μὲν μέθεξιν λέγουσι, καὶ αἴτιον τί τῆς μεθέξεως καὶ τί τὸ μετέχειν ἀποροῦσιν); 
this is followed by the introduction of an alternative way of explaining union which is also 
wrong (οἱ δὲ συνουσίαν [ψυχῆς], ὥσπερ Λυκόφρων, 1045b9-10; ἢ συνουσία ἢ σύνδεσμος ἢ 
σύνθεσις, 1045b13). Yet, probably, both positions share a common (Platonic) mistake, i.e. that 
of the independence (and actuality) of the parts of a compound, which Aristotle rejects in 
1045b16-23. (I keep with Ross 1924 the last lines of the chapter; for a discussion see Morel 2015, 
200-5). 
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compounds, on the one hand, and things that are immediately one absolute 
units were already considered in Z17 (1041b8-11).22 The last section of H6 
(1045b11-23) reassesses the main topic of the chapter, i.e. the inquiry on the 
cause of the compound’s unity, as it was already raised in 1045a8-10: 
 
But, as it has been said,23 the last matter and the form are one and 
the same, the one potentially, the other actually; therefore, it 
amounts almost to the same to investigate which is the cause of the 
unity and of being one. For each thing is a unity, and the potential 
and the actual are somehow a unity. Therefore there is no other 
cause24 unless there is something that moved from potentiality to 
actuality. (1045b17-22)25 
 
In the next sections of this paper, I will try to show that this final solution in-
volves an explanatory model that is argued for only in the previous chapters of 
H; but for now let me draw the outline of H6’s main outcome. The different 
causal role of both components (form and matter) translated by Aristotle here 
in modal terms (actuality and potentiality) can guarantee the vertical or syn-
chronic unity of a material substance. This is rendered possible thanks to the 
causal role played by the form that actualizes the dispositional properties of the 
proximate matter, and in this way it brings about the unified compound. Mate-
rial substances are constituted by what Aristotle calls last or proximate matter 
(ἡ ἐσχάτη ὕλη, 1045b18). This is the matter that results from the differentiation 
or specification of the preexisting matter by means of the form’s causal role. 
Specifying the matter in that way implies that it now plays a functional role 
within the compound, and this new role implies, in turn, a radical change in the 
preexisting matter. The potential aspect of matter can be grasped in terms of 
the definition of motion or change provided in Physics III 1, 201a27-29 (a para-
phrase of 201a10-11): 
  
-------------------------------------------- 
22 These immediate unities are contrasted to material wholes in the last line of H6 
(1045b23): ὅσα δὲ μὴ ἔχει ὕλην, πάντα ἁπλῶς ὅπερ ἕν τι.  
23 See 1045a23-24, 1045a29-30. 
24 Meaning that that there is no further cause of unity besides the two items already 
mentioned, i.e. the actual form and the potential matter. 
25 My translation. In 1045a30-31, Aristotle claims that in the case of individuals which 
are subjected to generation and corruption the essence and the efficient cause explain the 
actualization of the potentiality. Commentators mostly think that H6 focuses on particular 
compounds (so Charles 1994, 88ff); however, the problem raised there and its possible solution 
apply to general compounds as well. Detel 2009, 636ff rightly claims that Aristotle restricts his 
consideration to particulars only in the last lines of this chapter (1045b21-22). 
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The <actuality>, then, of what is potentially when being in actu-
ality it is operating, not qua itself but qua changeable is change.26 
 
This definition states that what is subjected to change combines being potential 
and being actual (ἡ δὲ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος ἐντελέχεια): it can change only if it is 
already something that is in actuality what another thing is in potentiality; so 
it cannot change as being actually that (ἐνεργῇ οὐχ ᾗ αὐτὸ) into which it 
changes. For the context of Metaphysics H the definition of the Physics has a 
double implication. First, the preexisting matter must be located one step before 
the constituent (or proximate) matter that makes up the compound (i.e. that can 
already change into the compound). But second, that constituent matter, as far 
as it constitutes the compound (materially) and it is subjected to change, can-
not be actually the same as what it makes up. As a consequence, the proximate 
matter, even if it is full-determined and, in a way, actual, cannot be a material 
constituent qua being actual (or it cannot change qua being already the thing 
into which it changes) (ἐνεργῇ οὐχ ᾗ αὐτὸ), but only qua being a constituent of 
the compound (in other words, it cannot change but as being something change-
able) (ἀλλ' ᾗ κινητόν).27 Otherwise, we would face the problem of indistinguish-
ability between the specified matter and the compound’s form.28  
Let me seize now up the impact that this consideration of the Physics can 
have on my reading of Metaphysics H. The general definition of motion allows 
us to claim that within any single compound there is only one actualized matter 
i.e. the constituent proximate matter that is suitable to perform the role re-
quired by the nature of the higher compound it makes up as matter. This is 
made clear in the Physics when in 201b5-8 Aristotle tries to pick out the time 
(and the conditions) in which something that is potential and can change can 
really exercise its potentiality:  
-------------------------------------------- 
26 ἡ δὲ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος <ἐντελέχεια>, ὅταν ἐντελεχείᾳ ὂν ἐνεργῇ οὐχ ᾗ αὐτὸ ἀλλ' ᾗ 
κινητόν, κίνησίς ἐστιν. (Translations from the Physics included here are Hussey’s). This formula 
has been admirably discussed by Kosman 1969; for clarifications see also Hussey 1983, 58-62; 
Vigo 1995, 109ff defends the definition against the charge of circularity in that he rightly grants 
ἐντελέχεια a non-procedural meaning. 
27 In the first account of motion in Ph. III 1 (201a10-11), this idea is expressed by a qua-
clause that must qualify ‘actuality’ (pace Hussey): “[…] the actuality of that which potentially 
is, qua such, is change” (ἡ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος ἐντελέχεια, ᾗ τοιοῦτον, κίνησίς ἐστιν). Hussey 
1983, 58 suggests to rephrase the qua-clause as follows: “The actuality-qua-potentially-being of 
that which potentially is.” He elucidates the ‘actuality-qua-potentially being’ (which is meant 
to characterize the state of the changing thing as such) as an exercise (which is an actuality) of 
a disposition to change (which is potentiality). In short, the changeable thing changes in that it 
exercises its capacity to change (or: it is changeable as such and in actuality in that it (actually) 
changes); see Aristotle’s example for change with building in 201a16-18: “[…] when that which 
is buildable is in actuality, in the respect in which we call it such, it is being built, and this is 
the process of building […]” (τὸ οἰκοδομητόν, ᾗ τοιοῦτον αὐτὸ […] ἐντελεχείᾳ ᾖ, οἰκοδομεῖται, 
καὶ ἔστιν τοῦτο οἰκοδόμησις). 
28 This is Ackrill’s problem (see Ackrill 1972/73). 
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[…] change occurs just when the actuality is this actuality, and nei-
ther before nor after (201b6-7). 
 
Thus, change occurs only during the process in which bricks and stones are 
changed into a house.29 As I have stressed, only the proximate matter is poten-
tially the form of the compound, in that such a matter involves the necessary 
disposition to constitute (or turn into) the compound’s form. For that matter to 
be potentially the form means that the matter’s actuality consists in its potenti-
ality to be (or constitute) that form. So the Physics’s teaching about the actuality 
of potentiality permits us to pick out the constituent matter as that stuff that has 
the necessary disposition to turn into the form. This is implied in the Physics 
when Aristotle claims that for some matter to be potentially the form means 
that such a matter has already the disposition to turn into that form or in 
Aristotle’s own wording in 201a28-29: the matter’s being in actuality-qua-
potentially (ἡ δὲ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος <ἐντελέχεια>) the form consists in the 
exercise of its disposition.30 The Physics excludes, therefore, that the matter that 
is the constituent of a house can only be the matter located one step back from 
the required determination (or potentiality to be a house). Now, as far as the 
proximate matter (bricks and stones) only has the required disposition 
(potentiality) to constitute the higher compound (the house), this teaching has 
also an important consequence for the compound’s unity and its single 
performance, since if the lower levels of matters (i.e. the matter’s that are not 
constituent) do not survive actually within the functionally determined 
proximate matter,31 then there will be no risk of finding many layers of 
actualized matters (endowed with possibly contradictory dispositions) 
coexisting in a single compound. 
With the help of the modal translation of the causal model introduced in 
Z17, Aristotle can manage in H to harmonize vertical (or synchronic) and hori-
zontal (or diachronic) unity. In fact, the dispositional properties of the preexist-
ing matter persist within the compound only as far as they are functionally 
specified as the constituent material parts of the compound. As I suggested, this 
persistence in change helps to avoid the problem of actual layers of matter. But 
once the compound is dissolved, those dispositional properties can become 
actual again. For instance, once an organic body is corrupted, their constituent 
parts are radically altered, and as a consequence of that radical change they 
-------------------------------------------- 
29 See Vigo 1995, 116f. 
30 See Hussey 1983, 61. 
31 This is prevented by Aristotle’s cautionary tone in its clarification of the qua-clause in 
Ph. III 1, 201a29-31: “[…] the bronze is potentially a statue, but yet it is not the actuality of 
bronze qua bronze that is change.” And then: “the actuality of potential, qua potential, is 
change” (ἡ τοῦ δυνατοῦ, ᾗ δυνατόν, ἐντελέχεια, 201b4-5). 
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become actual, i.e. they actualize previous dispositions. For example, the bones 
and the sinews, which were radically changed to become parts of a hand, re-
cover once this hand is corrupted their own material forms, and so the pro-
cess of corruption gives rise to actual compounds (bones and sinews), which 
are what we called the preexisting matter of a hand. But we must also empha-
size that generation involves a radical change in the preexisting matter, so that 
the form of that matter cannot survive, i.e. the forms of the bones and the sinews 
perish when they become constituent parts of a hand. Once again, the minimal 
condition for persistence established by the persistence of the dispositional 
properties actualized as constituent matter of a higher compound does not 
result in layers of actual matter (i.e. forms) within a higher compound.  
These complex details are compactly conveyed in the final message of H6 
quoted above, which states that the matter of a compound is the same as the 
form, but only in potentiality. So the matter does not enter into a compound 
with its own form unchanged, because its potential being refers to (i.e. depends 
on) the form (of the higher compound), which remains being the only actual 
factor within the compound. In sum, on the one hand, the vertical unity of a 
compound is guaranteed by the actualization or specification (brought about by 
the highest form of the compound) of the lower material forms that preexist to 
the compound. And on the other hand, the dispositional material properties that 
persist in the higher compound guarantee the horizontal unity by establishing 
a minimal but sufficient continuity in substantial change. 
There is still the problem of unity that should be solved by H6’s specifying 
model. Composite substances must be strong unities (i.e. a whole, not a heap, 
in the words of Z17). But Aristotle holds that we cannot get a strong unity from 
merely potential parts. In Z16, 1040b5-26, he demotes the parts of the animals 
and the elements as to the substance range precisely because they cannot exist 
separate or build a unity on their own. Thus, they are taken as merely potential 
components. For the present context, this means that potential parts cannot 
ground a strongly unified compound. But, isn’t it said by Aristotle in H6 pre-
cisely that matter is potential? So how could Aristotle avoid that the potential 
status of matter lastly results in a demotion of the unity of compounds in H6? 
To solve this difficulty, the model of H6 tries to harmonize the actuality of the 
proximate matter with the compound’s strong (i.e. vertical) unity. This is no 
longer a problem for Aristotle in that he manages to explain the constituent 
matter as the only actual existing stuff within the (single) compound. That 
matter is, as he triumphantly claims in H6, the matter that, as a result of having 
been actualized by the form, is one and the same with that form. 
Let me close this section by stressing some points. Since (i) by means of 
H6’s specifying model, the proximate matter is explained as the only actualized 
constituent of the composite substance, Aristotle can hit two targets with one 
  F. MIÉ  -  REFINING THE MATERIAL SUBSTANCE  68 
SÍNTESIS. REVISTA DE FILOSOFÍA I (2) 2018; pp. 54-100 e-ISSN: 2452-4476 
shot by justifying unity and substantiality of material compounds. Further, (ii) 
by being potentially the same as the form, the proximate matter is essentially 
what the form is. But (iii) at the same time, since form and matter have different 
explanatory responsibilities, they cannot be one and the same without restriction 
(i.e. the problem of indistinguishability of form and matter).32 
 
4. EXPLORING MATERIAL SUBSTANCE IN THE “SHALE” OF H1-5. 
H1 AS A SUMMARY AND TRANSITION 
I have claimed that Aristotle did not fully justify his two main theses in Z17. In 
fact, (1) he did not explain how the causal role of form does account for its being 
different from the compound and its matter, and further (2) he does not manage 
to fully clarify the conditions that must be fulfilled by material parts to consti-
tute a unified whole rather a mere heap. I have also suggested that H6 draws a 
line under the argument that develops a complex explanatory model through 
which, one can guess, Aristotle thinks that Z17’s two remaining difficulties can 
be solved. To put it simply, by means of H6’s specifying model, Aristotle holds 
(i) that the (highest) form functionally specifies the (proximate) matter. Thus, 
as a consequence of form’s explanatory role, (ii) he is able to justify in H6 the 
priority of form and its distinction from both the compound and its matter. So, 
(iii) Aristotle gets a unified whole, eventually, because the material parts are 
fully determined by the form of the higher compound they constitute i.e. the 
materials that become constituent parts of a higher compound do not keep their 
own forms and are neither independent nor actual. 
H6’s elegant solution to Z17’s problem is very appealing; but in the chain 
of the argument leading to the solution I sketched above almost every link is 
still missing. Fortunately, those links can be found in H1-5. I would like to begin 
my reconstruction of that chain by considering H’s first link in chapter 1, which 
introduces the role of matter as potentiality. This link is then interrupted for a 
while in H2-3, where Aristotle shifts to form as actuality, but it is shortly after 
picked up in H4-5. These are the links, roughly speaking, of H’s big project.33 
-------------------------------------------- 
32 Aristotle’s position in Metaph. H entails as a further consequence that the strong unity 
of compounds requires that the predicative relation between form and matter cannot be 
accidental. Being said of something different is the predicative structure of accidental 
relationship, according to Z4, 1030a4. The strong unity of material compounds is resisted by 
Loux 1991 and Loux 1995 with the argument that the matter is predetermined and, therefore, 
its unity with the form cannot be a necessary one. This sort of reading is classified by Rhenius 
2005 as “traditionalism.” In many aspects of the interpretation of H6 I agree with Detel 2009, 
621-654 (see in particular 644ff). 
33 Detel 2009, 642, stresses the importance of H1-5 for the whole argument of the book: 
“Der wesentliche Grund dafür ist, dass man den einheitlichen systematischen Zugriff auf dieses 
Problem in den Büchern VII und VIII verkannt und den Beitrag der Kapiteln VIII 2-5 
unterschätzt hat.” Even if Gill 1996, 217 undertakes a reappraisal of H1-5, she maintains her 
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The first problem interpreters face in H1 concerns the scope and meaning 
of the summary Aristotle announces in 1042a3-4. So I will start from that issue. 
Let us first take a look at the distribution of topics in the chapter. The summary 
spans from 1042a3 to 1042a24, and it contains two clearly distinct sections. In 
the first one (1042a3-5), Aristotle draws some conclusion from what has been 
said; he refers, probably, to the previous investigation when he claims that the 
inquiry dealt with the causes of substances. It is an open question for interpret-
ers whether this is really a reference to the discussion on substance in book Z, 
and more particularly to Z17’s innovative starting point that makes form a prin-
ciple and cause or it rather involves within its vision radius a wider scope of 
investigations presented in other books of the Metaphysics. I will discuss this 
alternative here below, but for now I should be content with warning in advance 
that this can be hardly taken as an uncontroversial reference to Z17, since Z17’s 
thesis, as I said, is that substantial form is cause. This seems to be a bit more 
specific than saying that, as Aristotle does in 1042a5-6, the inquiry was about 
the causes, the principles, and the elements of substances. In the second section 
of this summary (1042a6-24), Aristotle makes a reference, in a closed synthesis, 
to the whole discussion of book Z (1042a13-24). In 1042a6-12, he further lists 
(he did likewise in Z2) different entities that are (commonly or exceptionally) 
held to be substance. In two short passages (1042a12 and 1042a22-23), Aristotle 
mentions Ideas and mathematical entities as things that the Platonists take to 
be substance, and he further postpones discussion about these entities, which 
is probably found in books MN. Afterwards, in 1042a24, Aristotle picks up sen-
sible substances, which, as it was already said in 1042a6, are commonly held to 
-------------------------------------------- 
view that these chapters do not offer a definitive solution to the problem of unity, which she 
only finds in Θ7 (with an important anticipation in H6): “Only in H 6 does Aristotle offer a 
viable framework for a solution he develops in Metaphysics Θ.” On the role of matter in 
substantial generation she claims: “For although matter is potentially but not actually the 
product, it is also something actual in its own right. And if this actual subject constitutes the 
generated object, as the letters A and B constitute the syllable ‘ba’, the subject is existentially 
prior to both the form and the composite, since the form is a property of it, and the composite 
is merely the compound of that subject characterized by that property.” (Gill 1996, 220f). So she 
raises the following dilemma: either (a) matter is already some sort of thing, so that form is 
nothing but a property added to (or accidentally predicated of) the subject therefore, matter is 
both logically and existentially prior to the form and to the compound; or (b) matter cannot 
be taken as being something definite, so that it cannot be explained which is matter’s real 
contribution to the compound. But, being that so, we can dispense with matter by giving an 
account of the material compound. (Gill suggests that this mirrors the state of matter when 
something is corrupt, i.e. the material substrate in corruption is deprived of any form.) Needless 
to say, option (a) does not permit to get a strong unity of compounds, and option (b) leads to 
disregard any matter and to reduce a compound to its form. Gill’s suggestion on Aristotle’s 
theory of matter in H1-5 is that he remains trapped there in a conception that holds matter to 
be something actual or a this (a tode ti). She relies heavily on this assumption to bring grist to 
her mill, i.e. to see ZH as mainly faulty solutions to the problem of unity. Detel 2009 favors a 
much stronger rehabilitation of H1-5; in fact, he stresses that H1-5 (but also Z12, Z14, and Z17) 
prepare the positive solution of H6, whose brief message can be fully assessed only against the 
backdrop of the previous detailed arguments. For a convincing criticism of Gill’s general 
reading on H see Seminara 2018. 
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be substances. After having declared that sensible substances are those having 
matter, Aristotle heads for a brief consideration that, interestingly enough, 
moves around the limits of Z3 (1029a2-5), since he claims that substances can 
be subject according to three different ways: either as form, or as matter, or as 
compound (1042a26-30). Notice that already in 1042a27-28 he describes matter 
in a way which is probably familiar to Aristotle’s audience and readers that, 
however, does not match his presentation of matter in Z3. In fact, Aristotle in-
troduces matter in H1 as a this (tode ti), not yet as something in actuality but 
rather as a this in potentiality.34 This last claim is the right transition to the later 
focus on matter that dominates discourse up to the end of the chapter (1042a32-
b8). But, contrarily to the result reached in Z3, 1029a27, Aristotle suggests here 
that matter is substance too; more precisely, matter is substance as subject of 
changes (among them, substantial change comes first). From this last section of 
H1 and the beginning of H2 (1042b9-11), we can obtain the delimitation of the 
main topic of book H: it is an investigation about material substance, or about 
the substance of the sensible things, which covers both matter (which is sub-
stance in potentiality) and form (which is substance in actuality).35 
One central remaining issue in the summary is whether Z17 is collected 
or not. It may be awkward to give a plain negative answer to that question, if 
we assume, along with most interpreters, that H takes its starting point from 
Z17. Yet, I suggested that 1042a5-6 cannot be taken as a precise reference to 
Z17. So if Z17 must be present in H1’s summary, how is it there? I think, prob-
ably the best way to approach this difficulty is with the help of Burnyeat’s read-
ing of 1042a3-4. Burnyeat stresses that the selective summary of H1 clearly 
indicates which topics of Z Aristotle wants his audience and readers to have in 
mind by bringing his next discussion in motion. Burnyeat also mentions that 
the non-exhaustive character of the summary squares with a non-stenographic 
record of book Z, and that this character is balanced under the assumption of a 
well informed reader, who already knows a lot about first philosophy. So, while 
other commentators evaluate the absence of any specific mention of Z17 in H1’s 
summary as a gap (so Bostock and the Londinensis), Burnyeat claims, on the 
-------------------------------------------- 
34 See ὕλην δὲ λέγω ἣ μὴ τόδε τι οὖσα ἐνεργείᾳ δυνάμει ἐστὶ τόδε τι (1042a27-28). This 
is repeated in 1042b10. It leads us to think that H1’s modal thesis on matter as potentiality is 
anticipated by the clarification of material parts as potentialities in Z16, 1040b6-14. 
35 Bostock 1994, 248-50 lists the arguments of Z that are present in H1’s summary as well 
as those absent from it. He suggests that all chapters of Z mentioned in H1’s summary were 
part of Z’s first redaction, to which some other were later added; precisely these ones would be 
missing in H1’s enumeration. For another list of passages of Z considered in H1’s summary, see 
Burnyeat 2001, 62f. Burnyeat means (as already the Londinensis did) that H1’s summary is a 
synthesis of the actual Z (excepting Z7-9 and Z12), and that it summarizes the discussion but 
not the results of Z. Similarly, Gill 1996, 212. On her part, Gill 1996, 214 suggests that the 
selective summary of Z in H1 reflects Aristotle’s strategy to put in brackets all other chapters 
of Z that do not directly lead to Z17’s new start. So she reads H1’s summary as putting forward 
the discussion of Z17. 
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contrary, that the purported absence of Z17 is reasonable, since the very char-
acter of the summary focuses on Z’s discussions without mentioning its proper 
positive contributions. This approach to the summary allows Burnyeat to make 
a crucial suggestion that has an important impact on our reading of book H. For 
Burnyeat, the summary of H1 should not be seen as a conclusion of Z’s argument 
as we are frequently led to think under the influence of most translations of 
1042a3-4, which take the summing up of the main topics (συναγαγόντας τὸ 
κεφάλαιον) as if, with this summary, we could get the conclusion of Z (τέλος 
ἐπιθεῖναι).36 So Burnyeat uses his opposition to the common translation of these 
lines to positively explain the absence of Z17 in H1’s summary. One main out-
come I would like to stress in Burnyeat’s reading of 1042a3-4 is that it makes it 
possible to recover H1-5 as the continuation of Z17’s discussion, and perhaps 
even as its completion, since there are no grounds for assuming that Aristotle 
could have intended the summary to put an end to Z17’s discussion. 
This approach to the summary differs significantly from current assess-
ments not only of H but also of Z. We may wonder, however, whether the mere 
restitution of the grammar of 1042a3-4 will suffice by itself to support such a 
large change of mind on ZH and, more particularly, to decide the dispute about 
the intention and scope of H1’s summary. One can translate καὶ συναγαγόντας 
τὸ κεφάλαιον τέλος ἐπιθεῖναι (1042a3-4) as Ross did, suggesting that after hav-
ing collected the main topics we put an end to the investigation about sub-
stance, yet without assuming therewith that the end we aim to put to this 
investigation is already reached at the end of the summary. In other words, there 
is no obligation, almost on whichever translation of the text, to make the end 
of the summary coincide with the end of the previous investigation.37 If this is 
so, there is no need to assess H2-5 (including the last section of H1) as a mere 
set of supplementary afterthoughts on Z, which are added once the summary 
“has put an end” (τέλος ἐπιθεῖναι) to the previous investigation. Putting an end 
may perfectly pick out a fixed point ahead. In that case, the summary would 
-------------------------------------------- 
36 Burnyeat 2001, 65-8. It may be convenient to quote right now this text, which I will 
translate here below: Ἐκ δὴ τῶν εἰρημένων συλλογίσασθαι δεῖ καὶ συναγαγόντας τὸ 
κεφάλαιον τέλος ἐπιθεῖναι. The reading criticized by Burnyeat here is best represented perhaps 
in Ross’s translation: “We must draw our conclusions from what has been said, and sum up our 
results, and put the finishing touch to our inquiry.” (emphasis added). Burnyeat tracks this 
reading to the Latin translation of Bessarion. One may guess that Bostock’s interpretation of 
H2-5 as a set of isolated notes and appendices on Z heavily depends on this sort of reading of 
the first lines of H1. So, Bostock can assume that H1’s summary closes Z, and what follows can 
be only a mere set of supplementary notes. See Bostock 1994, 259f. 
37 In spite of his general reading of H, Bostock 1994 makes a better sense of this text in 
his translation: “Now we must bring together what has been said, draw our conclusions, and so 
bring the enquiry to its completion.” (emphasis added). For a detailed commentary on these lines 
and the summary see Morel 2015, 82ff. Pfeiffer 2016, 3 points to the topics mentioned in Θ1, 
1045b27-32 to suggest that the investigation announced in the summary of H1 is only completed 
by the end of the book. However, Θ1 does not provide any specific mention of the subjects 
covered in H. On this, see Ross 1924, II 240 and Makin 2006, 17. 
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mark a pause in the development of the argument of Z17 and, at the same time, 
a transition towards its completion to be reached at some point in H (perhaps in 
H6). In the end, this suggestion is compatible with Burnyeat’s point: the con-
clusions we must bring together (συλλογίσασθαι) cannot be those mentioned 
in the summary, but rather those we have to reach along the road of H2-5.38 
Let me now propose a working translation of H1, 1042a3-4: 
 
From what has been said, at this point, we must draw the conclu-
sions and bring <the inquiry> to its completion after having col-
lected the main topics. 
 
The next lines cannot be undoubtedly taken as referring to Z17’s very specific 
inquiry about form as cause and matter as element of the compound: 
 
Now, it is already said that we inquire about the causes, the princi-
ples, and the elements of substances (H1, 1042a5-6) 
 
These lines can be a much more general reference to the objects of inquiry of 
first philosophy, as this is defined in Metaph. Γ1-2 and Ε1.39 I am satisfied with 
having made plausible that, if H1, 1042a4-6 was intended as a reference to Z17, 
this mention does not honor enough the importance of Z17’s new point of 
departure and thesis. If the present interpretive suggestion on H1’s summary is 
accepted, then Burnyeat’s solution turns out to be very appealing. Since he 
explains the omission of Z17 as a mere fact depending on the character and 
purpose of the summary, it is a pause of Z17 and a transition to H which 
continues from 1042a24 on. That is simply why Z17’s conclusion is omitted in 
the summary. 
Let me round off this section by mentioning the main outcomes of the 
above sketched reading. A remarkable consequence I accept here is that, assum-
ing that H is the completion of Z does not amount to a disqualification of Z 
either as to its argumentative development or as to its conceptual and theoretic 
apparatus. It certainly results in turning over the significance of these books as 
regards Aristotle’s achievements and solutions about the problems of his theory 
-------------------------------------------- 
38 “Now it becomes clear that the summary is a prelude to the completion, not the 
completion itself. […] The completion of Z is the rest of H.” Burnyeat 2001, 66. 
39 Z17’s specific point of departure is signalized as follows: “Since the substance, then, is 
a principle and a certain cause, we must start from that point.” (Z17, 1041a9-10). Ross 1924, II 
226 assumes that H1, 1042a4-6 makes a general reference to Z1. But Burnyeat denies that these 
lines can refer to Z1 and suggests instead that they presuppose the inquiry of E1 (see 1042a5-6 
with 1025b3-4), Γ1 (1003a21-22, a26-27, a31), and Γ2 (1003b18). 
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of material substance in the central books of the Metaphysics. This evidently 
involves a rejection of the common view that considers Z as Aristotle’s final 
word on substance in the central books.40 It finally turns out that reading the 
scope of the summary of H1 like Burnyeat did will require reading Z17-H in a 
straightforward linear way.41 However, it is important to note that the general 
reading of the summary, which takes it as a pause of Z17 and a transition to the 
next chapters of book H, cannot decide the issue as to the intrinsic qualities of 
the completion of Z provided by book H. In fact, even among interpreters that 
are sympathetic to rehabilitating H as a whole, there are heavily different views 
on the book’s real contribution to Z’s theory of substance. Let me here present 
mine. 
 
5. H2: THE PRIORITY OF FORM AS ACTUALITY AND ITS 
SPECIFICATION THROUGH THE DIFFERENCES 
The first two links that constitute the big chain of H1-5 are H2-3. H2’s first lines 
(1042b9-11) help to tie together H’s general argument by means of one of the 
most important links of the chain of this book, i.e. the distinction between form 
as actuality and matter as potentiality. In H1, 1042a23-b8, Aristotle focuses on 
the main topic of this book, i.e. sensible substance (1042a23), which is made of 
matter (1042a26). There, he takes up one main criterion, drawn from Z3, to mark 
off substance, i.e. that substance is subject (1042a26). He repeats, thereupon, 
which entities could play the role of a subject: the matter which is swiftly 
clarified as being something definite (or a this) only in potentiality but not in 
actuality (ὕλην δὲ λέγω ἣ μὴ τόδε τι οὖσα ἐνεργείᾳ δυνάμει ἐστὶ τόδε τι, 
1042a27-28), next, the form, and, finally, the compound (1042a26-30).42 From 
-------------------------------------------- 
40 This is the view of Frede and Patzig 1988; the contrary opinion is held by Burnyeat 
2001, 68: “For the map now shows Z1-16 as preliminary to Z17-H.” Among interpretations that 
tend to deprive Z of weight, I count those emphasizing (rather unilaterally) the aporematic 
feature of Z’s arguments. This is another common view on Z I do not endorse. 
41 Burnyeat links the linearity issue to the two levels; accordingly, the linear argument of 
H would stand at a metaphysical level, whereas the non-linear Z would be at a logical level 
(firmly established at Z4). However, if it is true that Z17’s new starting point is not broken off 
the trunk of Z1-16, then it will be at least feasible to think of H as a completion of the entire 
book Z, rather than to restrict that completion to be exclusively a further development of Z17’s 
positive results.  
42 It may be convenient to sketch, at least, how I see Z3 in relation to H. I hold that a 
main result of Z3 is that matter as it is there conceived, i.e. as a sort of residual substrate lacking 
any determination (according to the outcome of the thought experiment in 1029a11-26) cannot 
be substance, if it is true that substance, besides being a subject, is separate and something 
definite or a this (1029a26-28). This already negative result makes hardly acceptable a reading 
like that by Devereux 2003, who claims that Z3 is the result of a new redaction written only 
after H’s new views on matter as potentiality. Not a vestige of such a modal conception of 
matter which is precisely the point of departure in the argument about matter in H1 (1042a27-
28) and H2 (1042b10) can be found in Z3, much less of the hierarchical conception of proximate 
matter developed later in H4-5. Z3’s diagnosis on matter which is not the same as saying that 
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1042a32 onwards Aristotle specifies different ways in which matter can be sub-
ject (according to the change classified under the different categories), the first 
of which corresponds to the matter as subject of substantial change (1042a5-
8).43 Similarly to the opinion recorded in Z3 (1029a32), Aristotle reflects in H2 
(1042b9-10) the common view according to which matter must be substance in 
some way. Perhaps because there is a general agreement on this view, he post-
pones its discussion and devotes his first more detailed examination to the other 
thing that is said to be substance (as subject), i.e. form. Form as actuality will be 
the topic of H2-3. By the end of H2 (1043a26-28), Aristotle highlights the topics 
of the chapter: he wants to have dealt with which is the sensible substance and 
how it is (τίς ἡ αἰσθητὴ οὐσία ἐστὶ καὶ πῶς).44 
At least a few words should be said about the controversial lines of H1, 
1042a32-b3, on the basis of which Gill built her dilemmatic reading of the con-
tradictory position of matter in H (i.e. as a complete substance and as a potential 
substrate).45 The problem is to reconcile two apparently contradictory descrip-
tions of matter found in H1, i.e. as potential being in 1042a28, and as an actual 
substance in 1042b3. Seminara concentrates his objections against Gill in the 
reading of Aristotle’s description of the subject of generation and corruption in 
1042b1-3. In particular, he claims that we can escape from Gill’s dilemma by 
taking “a this” in νῦν μὲν ὑποκείμενον ὡς τόδε τι as referring to the state of 
matter in “the end of the process of generation,” where the matter, having at 
that time its own form, is a this.46 In that way, Seminara tries to reconcile the 
actuality of matter involved in the qualification τόδε τι with the potentiality 
-------------------------------------------- 
it is on Aristotle’s own position implies rather a flat matter deprived of any dispositional 
properties and located at the bottom, which can hardly make room for proximate matter. Morel 
2015, 30, 32f holds a slightly different view on Z3; he tends to make Z3 and H4-5 compatible on 
that score. So he writes (referring to H4): “L’attribution à la matière du statut de substance n’est 
donc pas un incident de parcours, une expression proposée ‘en passant’: c’est le premier temps 
d’un changement de discours, par rapport à Z3, que H2 y H4 vont confirmer. Ce changement 
de discours ne signifie pas pour autant changement de doctrine: plutôt un raffinement de la 
doctrine telle qu’elle est exposée en Z3.” Morel 2015, 35. 
43 To refer to the matter involved in substantial change, Aristotle resorts to the unusual 
wording (ὕλην) γεννητὴν καὶ φθαρτὴν (1042b6). In general, these lines convey a well-known 
doctrine from Ph. I 5-9 and GC I 4, to which Aristotle refers in 1042b8. But it is hardly possible 
that H1 conveys all what Aristotle has to say about matter. This passage reflects, rather, a 
shared view on matter (ὁμολογεῖται in 1042b9-10, and δῆλον in 1042a32). I will suggest here 
below that H4-5 presents a more fine-grained view about matter than that sketched at the end 
of H1. 
44 In Z3, 1029a32-34, Aristotle emphasizes that it is difficult to know how form could be 
substance as subject; next, in Z4-6 he goes on to inquire about the form in those entities that 
are commonly held to be substances, i.e. sensible things. Taking that into account, H2-3 are 
likely to be seen as a programmatic continuation of the discussion on form as substance 
launched at the end of Z3 (and perhaps continued as a way of preparation in Z4-6). Besides, H2, 
1042b10-11 can be understood in relation to Z3, 1029a32-34 (with the addition of the modal 
vocabulary). 
45 Gill 1989, 86ff. 
46 Matter not having yet acquired the form during the process of generation and thus 
not being a this is standard theory; see Ph. I 7, 191a10-11. 
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granted to matter in 1042a27-28 (ὕλην δὲ λέγω ἣ μὴ τόδε τι οὖσα ἐνεργείᾳ 
δυνάμει ἐστὶ τόδε τι). Correspondingly, the subject described in 1042b3 as de-
prived of a positive character or form is the matter at final time in the process 
of corruption.47 Seminara’s is a thinkable option both to Gill’s dilemmatic read-
ing of these two passages and to Ross’s way out, which consists in stating that 
the subject mentioned in νῦν μὲν ὑποκείμενον ὡς τόδε τι (1042b2-3) is the com-
plete substance that undergoes the process of destruction, whereas the subject 
introduced in πάλιν δ' ὑποκείμενον ὡς κατὰ στέρησιν (1042b3) is the substance 
which underlies generation, i.e. the matter qualified by the privation of the form 
(acquired later as a result of generation).48 On his part, Morel remarks on these 
lines are, to say the least, salutary: calling the subject involved in generation a 
τόδε τι does not necessarily mean (as Gill assumes and Ross’s way out tries to 
avoid) that it is an actual being.49 So Morel’s remarks which I would accept 
here promote the idea that the matter involved in generation can still have 
some degree of determination (since it is, in the end, something that has a form, 
like bronze), without being obliged to pay the price of counting that matter as 
an individual or complete substance.50 According to this suggestion, the subject 
involved in corruption could be qualified as ὡς κατὰ στέρησιν in that the 
material subject that undergoes destruction is deprived of its former 
dispositional properties.51 This is a reading of 1042b1-3 that is consistent with 
the general interpretation I aim to present here.52 
But let me turn now to H2. This chapter helps to specify the role of form 
as cause and to explain form’s actuality by means of the differences (διαφορὰς, 
1042b12, b32). Against Democritus who is praised nonetheless for having in-
troduced the idea of the differences, Aristotle emphasizes that there are many 
differences (1042b11-15). He uses this idea to clarify how form specifies different 
materials. So Aristotle gives concrete expression to the suggestion that form 
must be understood in relation to matter in that form actualizes the matter’s 
dispositional properties: in reference to a piece of wood, the difference that con-
sists in being located above the door specifies this matter in a way that is ex-
plained by what a lintel is. But another difference that of being located at the 
-------------------------------------------- 
47 Seminara 2018, 102-5. 
48 Ross 1924, II 227 reads these lines in a chiastic way. 
49 Morel 2015, 99. 
50 Similarly Pfeiffer 2016, 7: “Die falsche Annahme, auf der die Interpretation von Gill 
wie auch Ross basiert, ist, dass der Ausdruck ‚bestimmtes Dies‘ gleichbedeutend mit 
‚bestimmtes Dies der Wirklichkeit nach‘ ist. [...] Auch ein dem Vermögen nach bestimmtes Dies 
ist ein bestimmtes Dies.” 
51 This does not mean that the material subject undergoing destruction is deprived of 
any form (ἡ στέρησις εἶδός πώς ἐστιν, Ph. II 1, 193b19-20); the opposites, between which change 
takes place, are two relative features or forms (Ph. I 7, 190b30-32). 
52 See my interpretation of H5, 1044b36-1045a2 by the end of section 10 (which is 
generally in line with Seminara 2018, 107). 
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bottom of a door specifies the same matter in a different way, so that the re-
sulting compound is explained as threshold (1042b15-31).  
We can advance on this view by focusing on two main outcomes of H2 
that confirm that in that chapter Aristotle programmatically develops Z17’s the-
sis about form as cause. The first relevant outcome of H2 concerns the differ-
ences. Indeed, they help to specify the causal role of form in view of the kind of 
matter that is arranged or organized by the form:53 
 
From this it is then clear that, since the substance of a thing is a 
cause of its being, it is among these <differences> that we have to 
inquire what the cause of the being of each of these things is. 
(1043a2-3)54 
 
The second germane outcome of H2 to be considered here depends in a way on 
the former, but it helps to clarify the relational notion of form, which was 
already involved in the claim of Z17 (1041b5-6) that states that whenever we 
raise the question why (about some hylomorphic compound), we include matter 
in our question. This thesis matches the following passage of H2: 
 
From this it is then clear that for a different matter the actuality 
and the formula are different too: in fact, for some <materials>, it 
is the composition, for others, the mixture, and even for others 
some other <of the differences> that have been mentioned. 
(1043a12-14)55 
 
What Aristotle suggests here is that we must describe the causal role of form in 
a much more detailed way than merely saying as in Z17 that the form is cause 
and principle; we must specify, as he urges now, the form in relation to the mat-
ter it arranges. Precisely this closer description of the causal role of form is 
-------------------------------------------- 
53 The differences of H2 are not the differentiae of Z12 (1037b19, 20, 22 etc.). However, I 
agree with Rapp 2018, 8 that the well-known division of a genus in differentiae resonates in the 
διαφορά of H2: the differentiae specify a (determinable) genus, and similarly the differences 
specify the form (generally taken) in its particular relation to a given portion of matter. 
54 Bostock’s translation (modified). 
55 In H4, 1044a27-29, Aristotle makes a similar claim. However, while in the passage of 
H2 Aristotle claims that there is a correspondence between different forms (or acts) and 
different materials, in H4 he suggests that the matter is functionally determined (as to its causal 
contribution to the compound) in relation to the form (according to the notion of hypothetical 
necessity presented in Ph. II 9). Roughly speaking, in H4 prevails a causal notion of matter that 
we do not find already developed in H2. But the two positions are compatible, since if matter is 
something definite (i.e. a substance) in that its dispositional properties are actualized by the 
form (i.e. the position of H2), what matter contributes to the explanation of the compound must 
be taken into account too (i.e. the position of H4). 
  F. MIÉ  -  REFINING THE MATERIAL SUBSTANCE  77 
SÍNTESIS. REVISTA DE FILOSOFÍA I (2) 2018; pp. 54-100 e-ISSN: 2452-4476 
possible by means of the differences. Besides, the differences in the definitions 
correspond to the role of the forms in the material compounds (1043a7); as it is 
made explicit in 1043a5-7, there is an analogy between differences and forms. 
What is conveyed by Aristotle in “so in other definitions <the difference> is 
what is closest <to actuality>” (καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁρισμοῖς μάλιστα, 1043a6-7) 
is just that in the realm of definitions the difference is what most closely corre-
sponds to the actuality predicated of matter in the realm of substances (καὶ ὡς 
ἐν ταῖς οὐσίαις τὸ τῆς ὕλης κατηγορούμενον αὐτὴ ἡ ἐνέργεια). This is a caveat 
meant to clarify the previous claim that, strictly speaking, the differences are 
not substances (or forms) (1043a4): since the differences operate whenever we 
make definitions, as it was already established in 1042b25-26 and then illus-
trated in 1043b7ff, the differences must be analogous to substances. However, 
this is not to say that the differences are linguistic items. On the contrary, in 
1042b25-26 (τὸ ἔστι τοσαυταχῶς λέγεται) it is suggested that the variety of dif-
ferences helps to specify the many things that are and also the many ways in 
which these things are spoken of: what a threshold is or what a lintel is is differ-
ent in virtue of the differences.56 Further, since the differences are explanatory of 
the very being of the things (εἴπερ ἡ οὐσία αἰτία τοῦ εἶναι ἕκαστον, ὅτι ἐν 
τούτοις ζητητέον τί τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι τούτων ἕκαστον, 1043a2-4), it cannot 
be wondered that the differences must be included in the definiens (of a real or 
explanatory definition) (ἐνίων δὲ τὸ εἶναι καὶ πᾶσι τούτοις ὁρισθήσεται, 
1042b28-29, see also 1043a7). We can get a better understanding of Aristotle’s 
point if we take a look at his examples. Threshold is defined as wood or stone 
lying in such a position (1043a7-8). Lying in such a position the definiens cor-
responds to the difference, because this formula mentions the actuality that dif-
ferentiates the disposition of what turns out to be the proximate matter of 
threshold (see also 1043a19-20). 
Interpreters especially interested in discussing Aristotle’s theory of defi-
nition of sensible substances focus particularly on the last section of H2 
(1043a14-26). There, Aristotle contrasts the account or the definition of a com-
pound by means of the potential matter with that by means of the actual form 
and the differences. If only matter is considered in the definiens, then we do not 
provide a proper definition, since matter is merely potential (τί ἐστιν οἰκία, ὅτι 
λίθοι πλίνθοι ξύλα, τὴν δυνάμει οἰκίαν λέγουσιν, ὕλη γὰρ ταῦτα, 1043a15-16), 
and so it is not enough to single out the essence of the thing. The definition 
must be always according to the form (1043a15-18). However, since we have to 
define a material compound, the proper definition must include the matter, i.e. 
it must take form and matter together (1043a18-21). Aristotle’s model for these 
combined definitions is the same as that he already used for giving an account 
-------------------------------------------- 
56 “The ‘is’ of the threshold and the ‘is’ of the lintel are different […] since being for the 
lintel means to lie in this particular way, while being for the threshold means to lie in a 
different way.” Rapp 2018, 10. 
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of threshold;57 and, in the end, this model seems to be also required for giving 
an account of the material substances as it was required in the first premise of 
the explanatory syllogism in Z17.58 
This is certainly not the place to address at length this controversial topic. 
Yet I would like to make a remark in support of my suggestion that the com-
bined definition is the only one that can have a full grip on the composition that 
properly belongs to material substances (οἱ δ' ἄμφω ταῦτα συντιθέντες τὴν 
τρίτην καὶ τὴν ἐκ τούτων οὐσίαν, 1043a18-19). And further, if it is true that H2 
favors a combined account of material substances, how does this sort of 
definition relate to Z12’s account by means of genus and differentiae? One 
plausible answer to this last question is given by Burnyeat; he suggests that 
Z12’s model for definition corresponds to H2’s definition by means of the form 
only one should find something like the genus and the differentiae in 1043a16-
18.59 But it would be problematic to make both models of definition simply 
coexist, as if both were equally capable of grasping material compounds. Taking 
for granted that the definiendum in H2 are material substances, and further that 
it is not desirable to reduce their definiens to mention just the form or the 
formal parts, like genus and differentiae as in “receptacle to shelter things and 
bodies”, then we should take H2 as ranking the three definitions rather than 
putting them on the same footing. In fact, contrarily to Burnyeat’s claim, 
Aristotle does not seem to accept in 1043a14-26 “with equanimity” that the 
three types of definition are acceptable. Rather, the coherent position that 
should be upheld by Aristotle would imply a ranking among these definitions, 
accepting as full definitions of compounds only those that put form and matter 
combined i.e. the so-called definitions of this (form) predicated of this (matter), 
according to the examples in 1043a18-26. 
 
6. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST REDUCTIVE MATERIALISM IN H3 
H3 has been judged to present a rather entangled argumentation; furthermore, 
the scope of, at least, some of its claims seems to be controversial for interpret-
ers (so are the reference to the Antisthenians in 1043b23-32 and the comparison 
between the unity of definition and the unity of number in 1043b32-1044a11). 
It also includes a possible later addition, which editors regularly print in brack-
ets (1043b14-23). However, it is remarkable that the topics, the vocabulary, and 
the examples of H3 are those of Z17 and its sequel in H2. H3’s likely contribu-
tion seems to consist in advocating the priority of form in 1043b5-14, which is 
-------------------------------------------- 
57 He praises Archytas for having worked with combined definitions (1043a22-26). 
58 This topic may be further elaborated by studying physical definition; see Metaph. Z10, 
1035a4-6; Z11, 1037a30-33; E1, 1025a30ff; K7, 1064a19-28; Ph. II 2, 194a1-14; De An. III 4, 429b13-
14, b18-21; Cael. I 9, 278a22-b9. 
59 Burnyeat 2001, 74, 85f. 
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followed by the discussion about the thesis of the Antisthenians in 1043b23-32, 
and it is then continued in 1043b32-1044a14, where H3 claims, once again, that 
form is irreducible to matter. These are the theses and the passages on which I 
will concentrate my attention in this and the following section.60 
To begin with, let me take a quick look at the structure of the chapter; 
this is a particularly important issue since the common view on H3 as a set of 
several notes probably fueled the parallel view on the entire book as a miscel-
laneous work.61 I think, this rather negative assessment on the complex organ-
ization of H3 should be moderated. It is also interesting to take into account 
that, although most commentators share the view that H3-5 are a mere set of 
notes, some of them, at least recently, suggest that there is a project in H. How-
ever, even those accepting that H develops a project (which would be driven 
mainly by the introduction of the modal concepts of potentiality for matter, and 
actuality for form) dissent as to the very degree of conceptual and argumenta-
tive development of the book. In any case, an exaggerated emphasis placed on 
the miscellaneous feature of these chapters may lead to unjustifiably undermine 
our assessment on the real argumentative level of H as well as on its proper 
contribution to the development of the project initiated in Z17.62 
The semantic issue, with which H3 begins (1043a29-b4), even if collateral 
to the main discussion of the book (1043a37-b1), is still rooted in H1, 1042a24-
31, where Aristotle picks up the question raised in Z3 about the three distinct 
ways in which a subject can be substance: matter, form, or compound can be 
subject, and therefore they fulfill a condition to be substance. The second sec-
tion of H3 spans from 1043b4 to b23 (editors take 1043b14-23 as parenthetic); 
there, Aristotle discusses whether two of the three aforementioned ways of be-
ing a substance, i.e. the form and the compound, are subjected to generation 
-------------------------------------------- 
60 The passage in 1043a29-b4 is closely connected with the last discussion of H2. There, 
Aristotle warns us about the ambiguity of sortal terms that can apply to the form and to the 
compound as well (in particular, whenever the compound lacks a proper denomination). 
Aristotle approaches this ambiguity by means of the focal meaning resource: the sortal term 
applies primarily to the form (since the form and its essence are one and the same, see 1043b2-
4) and secondarily to the compound (οὐχ ὡς ἑνὶ λόγῳ λεγόμενον ἀλλ' ὡς πρὸς ἕν, 1043a37). 
This topic is not immediately relevant to the present discussion on sensible substance (1043a38-
b1). Burnyeat 2001, 70 offers an interesting explanation about the semantic discussion of the 
beginning of H3 along the following lines: since H2 focuses on form as actuality, and it is 
evident that the form is the same as its essence, then it is evident that form is the first reference 
of the sortal terms. This interpretation relies on a passage of Z10 (1035a7-9). 
61 Such is the view of Ross 1924, II 231 and of Gill 1996, 210 on H3. Even a “linearist” on 
H, like Burnyeat 2001, 69, 71, believes that H3 is a miscellany and that it is an appendix of 
memories and corollaries on form and matter. 
62 Authors currently working on the new image of H agree that this book carries out a 
project that mainly consists in a refined theory of material substance. For Burnyeat 2001, 71, H3 
is a corollary to H2 and Z17 on the topic of substantial form; similarly, H4-5 is to him another 
corollary on matter, which connects with the last section of H1. Although, in that way, Burnyeat 
contributes to the overall recovery of H’s unity and consistence, he continues holding that these 
chapters are, in the end, “a miscellaneous bunch of topics.”  
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and corruption. The position Aristotle holds there is in agreement with Z8’s 
thesis about the incorruptibility of form.63 The third section of H3 (1043b23-
1044a11) tackles a problem about definition and makes a comparison between 
substance and definition, on the one hand, and number, on the other; it also 
includes a section devoted to discuss a difficulty involved in a claim about def-
inition held by the Antisthenians (1043b23-32). The chapter closes (1044b11-14) 
with a mention of the topics considered in the second and third sections. 
H3’s main argument for the priority of form in 1043b5-14 is based on the 
assumption that form is irreducible to matter this is in line with Z17’s irreduc-
ibility argument. Aristotle takes up there the practitioners of inquiry (1043b5) 
and he is somehow guided by them. It is important to note that, as I mentioned, 
this passage elaborates on the theses and the vocabulary of Z17 and H2; in par-
ticular, the reference to inquiry (ζητοῦσιν, 1043b5) takes us back to Z17 
(ζητεῖται, 1041a10, see also 1041a27, b3, b5). An obvious but significant point to 
better understand the etiological approach of H3 is that, as in Z17, inquiry is 
mainly concerned with causal explanation. Aristotle makes the following re-
mark: when we inquire, we do not put the form just besides the matter, i.e. we 
do not take a house to be bricks and stones plus some arrangement. I think, this 
is Aristotle’s warning about a possible misunderstanding of the combined defi-
nitions he favored at the end of H2 (1043a18), since, in fact, we have to avoid 
that, in both causal explanations and definitions, form and matter are put to-
gether on a same footing. Otherwise, form would be another part of the com-
pound but this consequence was already rejected in Z17’s irreducibility argu-
ment. Thus, compounds cannot be rightly described by merely including the 
form as some further part (οὐδ' ἡ οἰκία πλίνθοι τε καὶ σύνθεσις, 1043b6), unless 
we are prepared to turn form into one further material part among the others 
(1043b7-8). The right approach to causal inquiry and to the definition of mate-
rial substances require, on the contrary, to put the form as the main explanatory 
factor of the compound’s being, i.e. to take the form as responsible for the 
specific arrangement of the material parts, which brings about a compound of 
some sort, e.g. the form of threshold that arranges wood or stone in a certain 
position (this resumes H2, 1042b19-20) helps to explain what a threshold is, i.e. 
what the function of a beam at the bottom of a doorway is, but not the other 
way around i.e. the beams do not really explain why are they in such a position 




63 This is possibly connected to the 8th and 10th aporiae from book B, where Aristotle 
raises the question as to whether the principles of corruptible things are corruptible or rather 
eternal. 
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[…] if the threshold is by position, the position is not from the 
threshold, but rather this64 from that.65 (1043b9-10) 
 
These lines admit two possible readings: a stronger and a weaker one. The 
weaker one claims that the position is not a further part of the compound. The 
stronger reading elaborates on a possible consequence of the weaker, to which 
it adds that what the compound and the matter are can be only explained by the 
form, i.e. the position is the cause of what some beams located at the bottom of 
an entrance are and what a threshold is. So, the position the placeholder of the 
form in this example helps to causally determine the beams as a constituent 
part and, on this basis, it classifies this object as a threshold. This is a variety of 
the syllogism of Z17, but in H2-3 Aristotle is more specific. A beam in such a 
position can only function as it is required by a threshold, in that the beam is 
an actual and constituent part of that working compound. According to the 
stronger interpretation, the position, as such, holds explanatory (and defini-
tional) priority with respect to matter even to the actualized matter of the 
compound (ὁ οὐδὸς θέσει, οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ οὐδοῦ ἡ θέσις, 1043b9). This is so because 
the actualized matter, i.e. that piece of wood of a certain length and with a cer-
tain resistance capability to hold the door’s jambs together, is properly ex-
plained only by defining what is the function of a threshold, i.e. by the form or 
essence. Aristotle develops this argument by means of a criticism against re-
ductive materialism, i.e. the position of those who turn over priorities that are 
considered as already established in the practice of inquiry. In fact, to explain 
what some composite thing is, reductive materialists wrongly resort to matter. 
Here, Aristotle attacks their position along the lines of his anti-reductionist 
argument of Z17:66 
 
Nor is man, then, animal and two-footed.67 But there must be some-
thing besides these, if they are matter; but <this>68 is neither an 
-------------------------------------------- 
64 The threshold, i.e. the compound thing. 
65 The position. The position is here the placeholder of form; so form cannot be explained 
or defined by means of the compound or by means of its materials (beams or stone). 
66 This position amounts to provide a definition according to the potential matter i.e. 
the first way of defining that is degraded by Aristotle when casting definitions in H2, 1043a15-
16. 
67 The problem raised here by Aristotle may include his own discussion in Z12 (i.e. why 
is a thing defined a unity?, 1037b11-12); but only as far as genus and differentiae are interpreted 
along the lines of Platonic Forms which Aristotle already tried to avoid in Z12 (1038a5-8, b25-
26). The Platonic position is conveyed in H3 by means of the definite article (τὸ ζῷον καὶ δίπουν, 
and compare this with Z12, 1037b12: τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ ζῷον δίπουν). 
68 What is to be a man. 
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element nor made of an element,69 but the substance,70 which peo-
ple who state the matter <are committed to> eliminate. If this is, 
then, the cause of <man’s> being, and this is substance,71 they will 
be failing to state72 the substance itself. (1043b10-14)73 
 
Interestingly enough, it turns out that reductive materialists the people at-
tacked here are committed to hold the same position Aristotle rejected already 
in Z3 (1029a27), since they must endorse the opinion that only matter is sub-
stance (1043b13-14). 
 
7. A NOTE ON ESSENCE AND THE UNITY OF DEFINITION IN H3 
In the next section, Aristotle spells out this criticism more in detail. He takes up 
a reasonable difficulty one can raise by considering the position on definition 
and its correlate endorsed by the Antisthenians (1043b24ff). Aristotle (critically) 
remarks that, under a certain conception of essence and definition, the Antis-
thenians are committed to turn the essence into something impossible to be 
grasped by a definition (οὐκ ἔστι τὸ τί ἔστιν ὁρίσασθαι, 1043b25). This unwel-
come result is, however, compulsory given their assumption about the “sim-
ples” and the sort of statement a definition is. Setting aside the controversial 
aspects of Aristotle’s report and other details in his argument,74 I will confine 
myself to making a suggestion about specifying the systematic connection 
between this controversy with the Antisthenians and the rest of the chapter. 
To my knowledge, what Aristotle tries to do here is to mark off a wrong 
notion of the sort of statement (logos) that a definition is. We begin with the 
general assumption that any definition is an account of the essence.75 A further 
assumption also anchored in Z4’s core notion of essence is that essence must 
-------------------------------------------- 
69 Z17 claims that the arrangement (of the elements) is neither a further element 
(1041b20-22) nor something made of elements (1042b22-25). 
70 Keeping, with Ross, the reading of the mss. in 1043b12: ἡ οὐσία (against Christ’s 
deletion, who is followed by Jaeger). 
71 Reading Ross’s text in 1043b13-14 with the codd.: καὶ οὐσία τοῦτο (against Jaeger 
punctuation, who follows Bonitz’s suggestion: οὐσίας, τοῦτο). 
72 Reading οὐ λέγοιεν in 1043b14 with the mss. EJ and Ross (followed by Detel) (against 
the omission of the negative particle in Ab, Al and Jaeger).  
73 This translation is borrowed from Ross’s and Bostock’s. 
74 In Metaph. Δ29, 1024b33, Aristotle grants to Antisthenes a commitment to “proper 
statement” or “one (name) for one (thing),” to which corresponds a conception of definition in 
terms of a sort of collection or combination of names. This may be the reason why Aristotle 
says in H3 (1043b26-27) that Antisthenian definitions would be like a λόγος μακρός. This theory 
is probably echoed in Socrates’s Dream in the Theaetetus (201e-202c). For a discussion see 
Brancacci 1990, chapter 8. 
75 This general notion can be traced back to Z4, 1030a6-7. 
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be something simple.76 It is relevant here to add the following question about 
substance and simplicity raised by the end of Z13 (1039a14-23). After having 
considered the composition of substances in the previous lines of that chapter 
which are said to be made up neither of universals nor of further substances 
existing in actuality, Aristotle suggests that we may be led to believe that any 
substance must be absolutely simple. But, as Aristotle remarks there, definable 
objects must have some sort of composition at least, the one involved in the 
procedure of defining through division by means of genus and differentiae. It is 
quite obvious that these assumptions about (i) the simplicity of substance and 
(ii) the composition of the object of definition overtly contradict the thesis of Z4 
about the correspondence of definition and substance, since (iii) by being incom-
posites, substances will no longer be definable.77 In Z13 (1039a21-23), Aristotle 
leaves unsettled his discussion about the simplicity of substance and the com-
positionality constraint of definitions. But there are reasons to believe that by 
reconsidering Z and H we can find his way out of this dead end road. A thought 
that can help is the claim in Z4 that essences do not have the structure of “this 
in that,” and, therefore, defining an essence does not involve a predicative struc-
ture like that of “one thing said of another” (ἄλλο κατ' ἄλλου λέγηται, 1030a4). 
Thus, even if substance (or essence) must have some sort of composition to be 
the object of definition, it can be still, in a way, simple at least, in that any 
essence is not like a compound.  
 This is the background against which, I suggest, Aristotle’s note about 
the Antisthenians in H3 should be interpreted. In fact, he points out there the 
following difficulty (1043b24-25): if, according to the Antisthenians, we take 
definitions to be a long formula (or statement) (ὅρον λόγον εἶναι μακρόν, 
1043b26) in which one thing is predicated of another (τὶ κατὰ τινὸς σημαίνει ὁ 
λόγος ὁ ὁριστικὸς, 1043b30-31), there will be no definition of simples.78 As we 
have seen, in Z12 and Z13 Aristotle seems to endorse that definitions are, in a 
way, complex formulae. In this context, the difficulty pointed out in H3 is that 
under an Antisthenian-inspired conception of the definitional formula as a sort 
of predication, there will be no grasping of simples among which Aristotelians 
essences are located in definitions. Similarly to Z13, Aristotle’s strategy in H3 
seems to be that of leaving this question open for the likely solution offered 
later on in H6. 
-------------------------------------------- 
76 Aristotle puts essence in strong contrast to compounds that have the structure of this 
in that (Z4, 1030a4, a11). This is, of course, a constant assumption in the later discussions on 
definition in Z (e.g. Z12, 1037b24-27). 
77 Bostock 1994, 226f warns that (iii) is in contradiction with Aristotle’s official position 
in Z; for support, Bostock refers to Z4 (1030a7-14), Z10 and Z11 (1037a33-b7). 
78 For describing simples, the Antisthenians would only accept comparisons (such as 
“silver is like tin”); but since they hold that any definition implies a complex structure, it would 
be impossible for them to provide an account of what it is for simples (1043b25-28). 
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8. H4: THE CAUSAL SPECIFICATION OF MATTER AS PROXIMATE 
H4-5 are the second duet that help to connect the chain of book H and to bridge 
the transition to the final thesis about the unity of compounds including ma-
terial substances expressed in H6. In these two chapters, Aristotle resumes his 
previous consideration on matter as a potential subject involved in change 
launched by the end of H1 (1042a26ff and H2, 1042b9-10). The main theoretical 
contribution made by H4-5 consists in giving a justification of both the status 
of matter as a potential being and of matter’s causal role in the constitution of 
a material compound. For that purpose, Aristotle first explains, in H4, that mat-
ter is cause in that it is proximate, and then, in H5, he goes on to clarify that 
matter is the subject of change mainly, of substantial change in that it is po-
tential. It is only on the basis of these argumentative developments that it can 
be then easily accepted in H6 that (proximate) matter is (potentially) the same 
as the form of the compound.79 
The first link of this duet is H4; there, Aristotle takes care of explaining 
that the proximate matter is specified enough to have the required dispositional 
properties to really constitute the compound. Only when reaching that high 
specification level, matter can be material substance. Commentators usually dis-
tinguish two sections in H4. The first one, in 1044a15-32, presents the hierar-
chical specification of matters, and the second one, in 1044a32-b20, underlines 
the causal role of matter. By considering a special case in which there is no 
properly a material subject of change, Aristotle explains how to give an account 
about the material aspect of things that change without having a proper mate-
rial subject. This consideration is linked to the previous passage by the topic 
already mentioned in 1044b5, which deals with the complete explanation we 
must always seek in inquiry. Let me start off with the first section, which, in 
view of the reconstruction of H’s program, is certainly the most important one. 
It is true to claim that, in a sense, in virtue of the hierarchical linkage of 
matters that compose a thing, very different material compounds share one and 
the same matter. This reasoning may be extended to all existing compounds in 
the world, and so we could eventually say that all things proceed from one and 
the same common matter, let us suppose, the four elements.80 On the basis of 
such reasoning, Aristotle opens his discourse to address matter in H4 (1044a15-
17); yet, his true purpose becomes clear only when he contrasts that purported 
common matter of all bodies with the proper matter of each thing. Shortly after, 
this proper matter will be said to be the only one that can really explain the 
material behavior of the thing it constitutes (1044a17-19) in other words, only 
-------------------------------------------- 
79 With this description of H4-5’s role within H, I grant these chapters a programmatic 
role. Contrarily, Bostock 1994, 272 labels these chapters as “miscellaneous observations on 
matter.” Detel 2009, 603-29 assigns them the task of preparing H6. 
80 This is suggested by Alexander 1891, 556, 6-8. 
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the proper matter of each thing, which is its proximate (or first) matter, can play 
a causal role. The etiological approach to substance, which governs Aristotle’s 
mind from Z17 on, can help us to understand his present claim: that only the 
matter that is proximate is cause, and therefore only proximate matter can be 
called material substance. 
This may be so in order to disambiguate the expression “first matter” 
(πρώτη ὕλη) here used by Aristotle. In this context,81 it refers to the matter that 
belongs immediately to the compound, e.g. the bronze of the statue, which is 
the matter that explains the main dispositional properties in the material per-
formance of the statue (e.g. its hardness, temperature, heaviness etc.). The very 
fact that in each complex thing (like a statue or a living body) there is a (hier-
archically ordered) linkage of stuffs contained, as Aristotle suggests in 1044a20-
22, makes it necessary that whoever tries to causally explain the thing’s perfor-
mance, she places particular emphasis on singling out the explanatorily relevant 
matter of the thing. Let me now quote the crucial lines I mentioned above: 
 
And there come to be several matters of the same thing when one 
is the matter of the next […]. (1044a20-21) 
 
Being that so, it turns out that it is an urgent task for inquirers to distinguish 
the preexisting from the constituent proximate matter of a compound. Aristotle’s 
idea, as I understand it, is that some matter, let us call it mi, could be explanato-
rily irrelevant with regard to some compound, even though mi is located in the 
very production line from which that compound comes to be. Nonetheless, mi 
is, in fact, irrelevant for the explanation of the compound’s material perfor-
mance just because that stuff is at a distant location from the thing’s composi-
tion. So even though mi is causally linked to the compound, its location in the 
production line far from the proper features of the composition makes that stuff 
explanatorily tangential for the compound’s performance. This reasoning leads 
to the assumption that the actual performance of a thing can be adequately 
explained only by means of its dispositional properties. In short, any remote 
matter, like mi, which is in a loose connection with the dispositional properties 
realized in a complex (higher) thing, is powerless for the explanation of a 
compound located at a level of complexity that is considerably higher than that 
of mi.82 
To better understand the linkage of matters and the corresponding spec-
ification of matter at each level in the composition of material substances, it 
-------------------------------------------- 
81 For similar contexts see Ph. II 1, 193a29, 193a9-12; GA I 20, 729a32; Metaph. Δ4, 
1014b32; Δ6, 1016a19-20 (all references are taken from Bostock 1994, 272). 
82 For many valuable remarks on this issue, see Kosman 1987. About Metaph. H4-5, see 
Morel 2015, 159-184 and Pfeiffer 2016, 19ff (who closely follows Code). 
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may be useful to consider two different senses distinguished by Aristotle for 
the locution τόδ' ἐκ τοῦδε in 1044b23-24; these are two ways of speaking about 
the provenance or the origin of something: 
 
(1)  A comes directly from {m, n} in that {m, n} is the matter of which A 
is made; 
(2) A comes indirectly from B in that A comes directly from {m, n}, 
which are the matter of which A is made, and B is split up into {m, 
n}. 
 
By means of this distinction, Aristotle gives an account of the possible double 
origin of some compounds; for instance, phlegm has a double origin that is ex-
plainable in terms of the aforementioned schema: 
 
(1*) phlegm comes directly from fat, and fat comes directly from sweet; 
(2*) phlegm comes indirectly from bile, and bile is split up into83 some stuff 
common to both bile and phlegm. 
 
While in schema (1) there is a chained differentiation of materials that are hier-
archically specified until getting to the proper and proximate matter of the com-
pound (phlegm, whose matter is fat), in schema (2) it is considered only an in-
direct origin in that one compound comes from the other only as far as the 
compound of origin (i.e. B, representing bile) is split up into some stuff that (at 
a certain point) can give rise to the proper stuff of B and A. Yet, this second 
model implies that the stuff into which the compound of origin is split up can-
not be directly the proper matter of the compound that is the point of arrival 
(i.e. A, representing phlegm). Furthermore, the hierarchical specification of ma-
terials in schema (1) means that phlegm cannot come directly from sweet but 
only by means of fat. Taking fat as made of sweet implies considering fat as a 
compound (which is located at a lower level than phlegm and which probably 
is a less complex thing than phlegm), whose proper matter is sweet.84  
Thus, the chain of matters implies that, even within a direct origin as in 
schema (1), there are closer and more remote locations of materials. Coming 
back to schema (2), the matter into which bile decomposes must be the matter 
from which (at some farther point) the stuff of phlegm and bile can originate 
-------------------------------------------- 
83 See τῷ ἀναλύεσθαι εἰς τὴν πρώτην ὕλην, 1044a22-23. 
84 Of course, the same consideration can be applied to sweet, taking for granted that 
sweet is not the stuff located at the most basic level (which is occupied by the four elements in 
the Aristotelian physical universe). The relation between more and less complex compounds is 
mirrored in the relation between organisms (wholes) and organs (parts). 
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directly. According to this latter schema, the shared matter of A and B should 
be the origin of either sweet or fat or some other stuff within the same chain of 
direct composition. So, in a way, the indirect origin is reduced to the direct one, 
since B, as such, cannot be the matter of A (bile is certainly not made of phlegm). 
By means of these two schemata, in sum, Aristotle provides an explanation of 
different ways of getting the origin of a compound, i.e. a direct and an indirect 
one. In a way, we can take them as having reverse directions, i.e. a forward and 
a backward movement, as suggested in 1044a24-25. According to the forward 
movement in schema (1), phlegm comes from materials that are in a forward 
direction (lastly) towards phlegm, i.e. onwards (πρὸ ὁδοῦ).85 According to the 
backward movement in schema (2), bile is the origin of phlegm only as far as 
bile decomposes into (backwards) some stuff that is, lastly, common to both bile 
and phlegm. In sum, schema (1) concern material constitution, and schema (2) 
concerns origin.86 However, we can also get the constituent matter after schema 
(2), but only in a non-immediate way.87 From H4’s etiological point of view, the 
most relevant distinction is that one between proximate and remote matter, 
whereas the distinction between two ways of getting the origin of something is 
subsidiary to the explanatory interest.88 As suggested above, this is a coherent 
and programmatic development of the same etiological point of view on sub-
stance launched in Z17. Lastly, H4’s schema (1) and the clarification about prox-
imate matter can be seen as a refinement of the idea conveyed in 1041b5: when-
ever we inquire about the cause of material substances, we end up by inquiring 
why some stuff constitutes a certain sort of thing.  
Having considered this all, the former schemata may be deemed indeed 
to be a refinement in the theory because they help to better understand which 
matter in the chain of stuffs is really a cause: only the proximate matter can be 
constituent. Besides, the present theory also helps to clarify how Aristotle’s 
model of a hierarchically ordered linkage of matters the last specification of 
which the proximate matter is really functions; and lastly, it helps to see why 
the hierarchical order of matters is relevant for the explanation of compounds. 
Aristotle claims in 1044a20-21 that one and the same compound has sev-
eral hierarchically ordered matters (πλείους ὗλαι), where one is the matter of 
the next. This is of crucial importance for his explanatory model in H. There 
are two significant consequences for the material explanation of a compound 
to be considered at this point. First, the very idea of a continuous hierarchy of 
matters, which are ordered according to being closer or farther in relation to 
-------------------------------------------- 
85 See LSJ s.v.: further on the way, forwards. 
86 The statement of bile not being the matter of phlegm can help to better understand a 
claim made about eternal things in the second section of the chapter: the stars are made of some 
matter let us say: ether but, as eternal substances, they do not originate from any other thing. 
87 See Bostock 1994, 273f and Detel 2009, 604ff. 
88 The etiological interest of H4 is stressed by Detel 2009, 610ff. 
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the highest compound, implies that the dispositional properties of the farther 
stuffs become specified step by step until the matter proper to the highest com-
pound is fully constituted. As it was anticipated in a former section (see section 
3 here above), Aristotle avoids any risk of having many actual layers of matters 
as being parts of one and the same compound. This is so because the various 
matters within a single compound must be distinguished between those farther 
and closer. This distinction implies, in turn, that the farther matters which 
preexist to the highest compound cannot be counted as the actual constituent 
matter of that compound. The only constituent matter, which is the proper ma-
terial cause of the compound, is that closest matter whose dispositional proper-
ties are fully actualized in the compound. But, second, the chain of matters 
involved in a compound enables Aristotle to build a far-reaching explanation. 
And this makes possible for him to account for some performances of the 
bronze of a statue by means of the matter of which bronze is an alloy, i.e. copper 
and tin the heaviness of a brazen statue is due to one of bronze’s constituents, 
i.e. tin. So, even though tin is not the proximate and properly explanatory 
matter of a brazen statue, it can in fact explain some relevant aspects of the 
statue’s performance just because tin is still effective in bronze but, certainly, 
only as being part of bronze. Thus, tin’s heaviness is integrated in the relevant 
dispositional properties of bronze, without the need of implying an actual layer 
of tin below the level of bronze. We might easily figure out a similar scenario 
for sweet, which is the matter of fat which is, in turn, the constituent proper 
matter of phlegm in schema (1). 
Another significant aspect of this model for material explanation is that 
even a farther located matter (or remote matter) in the production line of a 
compound can have a causal incidence on the compound’s performance. On the 
contrary, a merely common shared matter located at some place at the bottom 
of many different compounds as it is also easy to imagine with the help of 
schema (2) (i.e. the remotest matter) would lack of any causal effectiveness as 
to the explanation of the higher compounds. Needless to say, such a scenario is 
akin to Pre-Socratic theories that commonly hold that a variety of things has a 
single material origin from which many things come directly.89 To avoid such 
a non-hierarchical model of matter, the meaning of the sentence at the outset 
of H4 (1044a16) should be conveniently restricted. Therefore, at the beginning 
of the chapter we should rather perceive a warning sign against Pre-Socratic 
style views on prime matter: 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
89 To claim, with Anaxagoras, that hair is like a seed, in which all constituents are 
contained, would be quite uninformative to say the least about the real behavior of hair, since 
a lot of different things in fact, for Anaxagoras, all things in the universe are supposed to be 
made of the same constituents. 
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On material substance we must not forget that even if all things 
come from the same primary <matter> or from the same <matter> 
taken as primary, and even if it is the same matter that is like a 
principle for the things that come into being, nevertheless there is 
some proper <matter> for each thing […] (1044a15-18) 
 
As it is shown in schema (2), several distinct compounds can come from the 
same matter; this probably leads Aristotle to examine in 1044a25-32 the possible 
relations between a product and its matter when one or the other is replaced or 
remains constant.90 We get the following four possible combinations: 
 
(a) Multiple relation between different products and one and the same mat-
ter: the matter of A can be also the matter of another (specifically differ-
ent) thing, B. This is explained by the intervention of the efficient cause 
(a carpenter can make a chair or a chest from the same piece of wood). 
(b) Single relation between product and matter: some things require some 
functionally suitable matter (a saw can be only made of some metals that 
are suitable for cutting).91 
(c) Multiple relation between product and different matters: this is only pos-
sible when an efficient cause strictly governs the process (a bed can be 
made of wood or iron only under the intervention of the carpenter).92 
(d) Multiple relation between product and matter: this is only possible if 
both efficient cause and matter are different.93 
 
Since these combinations introduce many explanatory factors (matter, efficient 
cause, and form and goal involved in the functional consideration), they help 
us to understand better how the claim in 1044a33-34 where Aristotle rounds 
off his explanatory model deeply rooted in the Analytics must be taken. On 
the basis of texts like Posterior Analytics II 11, he argues there that any complete 
inquiry must give an exhaustive explanation by considering as many causes as 
possible. For the material explanation of H4, this implies that we must have into 
-------------------------------------------- 
90 Bostock 1994, 273 rightly points out that this passage considers exceptions to that rule 
established in the first paragraph of the chapter; i.e. that for each thing there is only one proper 
matter. 
91 Ph. II 9, 200a10-13, 200a30-b8; PA I 1. 
92 Variant of (a). 
93 Variant of (c) that arises from deleting the constant factor in (c). 
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account the proximate matter, since, as it has been shown, this is the only one 
that really explains the material performance of the compound (1044a33-b5).94 
 
9. H5: MATTER AS SUBJECT AND AS POTENTIAL BEING 
In H5, Aristotle examines problems concerning the material substrate of 
change. With this, he resumes the role granted to matter in H1 (1043a32-b8), 
but the discussion in H5 is enriched with H4’s acquisitions. H5 continues dis-
cussing the issue raised in H4’s second section;95 so, H5 starts with a distinction 
between things that have matter and change, on the one hand, and others that 
have neither of them, on the other hand. Two general ideas that are well known 
from the Physics are motorized here; first, that only things having matter can 
change which takes place between opposites; and, second, that matter is the 
subject of change.96 Later on, Aristotle examines two aporiae: the first one in 
1044b29-32, and the second in 1044b32-1045a6, but the latter can be deemed to 
be a mere sequel of the former. If it is acceptable to say that H4 justifies that 
matter is substance because it plays a causal role as proper matter, then it is likely 
to assume that H5 purports to fulfill its own task of further justifying that mat-
ter is substance by showing that matter is the substrate of change. Thus, the 
project of each of these chapters is in strict correspondence with two main 
claims on matter already made in H1, i.e. that matter is something determinate 
(or a this) in potentiality (δυνάμει ἐστὶ τόδε τι, 1042a28) which is justified in 
H4’s thesis about the proximate proper matter and further that matter is the 
potential subject of change (οὐσία καὶ ἡ ὕλη, δῆλον· ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς 
ἀντικειμέναις μεταβολαῖς ἐστί τι τὸ ὑποκείμενον ταῖς μεταβολαῖς, 1042a32-34) 
which is justified in H5’s clarification about how the same matter could be 
subject of generation and corruption.97 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
94 In the second section of H4 (1044a32-b20), Aristotle considers two special cases for 
introducing matter as a cause. (a) Eternal substances do only have constituent matter, but, by 
being eternal, they cannot have an origin (1044b3-8). (b) Things by nature that are not 
substances (natural events, both in the external world and mental, as well as accidents) do not 
have matter or, rather, they have a substance as their own subject (moon for eclipse, heart for 
sleep) (1044b8-20). Perhaps, at least for sleep, there is, lastly, some material cause, since, for 
instance, some features of sleep, like the weakening of the capacity to perceive, is due to 
material factors in the heart (weakening of life activity due to digestion, which, in turn, has an 
effect on the cold blood running to the heart). (This process is described in De Somno 457a33-
458a10; PA I 7, 653a10-20.) 
95 Bostock 1994, 276 suggests that the connection is quite loose. 
96 Aristotle does not consider here substances changing only as regards place (i.e. having 
only local matter, H1, 1042b6; H4, 1044b7-8). 
97 As far as H5 considers reciprocal substantial change (processes of generation and 
corruption), it is not restricted to corruption, contrarily to what is claimed by Gill 1996, 223 and 
Detel 2009, 621. 
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10. ONE AND THE SAME MATTER IN DIFFERENT STATES: H5’S FIRST 
(AND SECOND) APORIA(E) ABOUT THE ROLE OF MATTER AS 
SUBJECT IN SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE 
The link of H5 to H4 is established by examining (in H5) the difficulty that has 
to do with some matters that can be subject of opposites in change (πῶς πρὸς 
τἀναντία ἡ ὕλη ἡ ἑκάστου ἔχει, 1044b29-30).98 It seems clear enough that this 
is a serious problem Aristotle’s theory has to face, since if some stuff, let us say, 
water, is the matter from which wine comes to be directly (according to the 
schema (1) of H4), and granting that water has the right dispositional properties 
to be specified as wine, then it is hardly conceivable that the same stuff could 
be the matter of the opposite of wine, i.e. vinegar, for vinegar seems to require 
other dispositional properties in its proper matter. Of course, one way out to 
this problem is to sever all connections between opposites in substantial change 
like that from wine to vinegar, or from living body to corpse. But, as we know, 
for several reasons mainly having to do with the condition of horizontal unity, 
this is not a thinkable way out for Aristotle. Let us now take a look at the 
presentation of the first difficulty: 
 
There is a difficulty as to how the matter, which is of each thing, 
relates to the opposites. For instance, if the body is potentially 
healthy, and disease is opposite to health, is it potentially both? 
And, is the water potentially wine and vinegar? Or is it rather mat-
ter of one of them according to the dispositional property and the 
form, but matter of the other one according to the privation and the 
corruption that is contrary to <the opposite’s> nature? (1044b29-
34).99 
 
It is worth noticing that this passage relies on two previous claims. First, that 
matter is a constituent potential part of the compound (i.e. the matter of which 
something is made, according to schema (1) in H4). Second, the passage also 
relies on the general structure of change mentioned in 1044b23-24 (where the 
emphasis falls on the distinction between substrate as that which properly 
changes and opposites between which the change occurs). On this basis, Aris-
-------------------------------------------- 
98 The mention of substantial and accidental change in 1044b25-26 sets the stage for the 
next distinctions between the relation of matter to opposites and the relation the opposites hold 
with each other. Bostock 1994, 276 thinks that 1044b25-26 holds a position that would be 
contradictory with the official doctrine on change in Ph. I 7, since he reads these lines as 
meaning that opposites originate one from the other without any intervention of the substrate. 
But it may be simply a loose expression by Aristotle to say that τἀναντία γίγνοιτο ἐξ ἀλλήλων, 
which does not contradict the thesis that any change operates on a substrate. See Ross 1924, II 
236. 
99 Following Ross’s translation and including modifications. 
  F. MIÉ  -  REFINING THE MATERIAL SUBSTANCE  92 
SÍNTESIS. REVISTA DE FILOSOFÍA I (2) 2018; pp. 54-100 e-ISSN: 2452-4476 
totle raises here the following questions: (a) can the same matter be, as the sub-
ject of change, potentially constituent of both opposites equally? Or rather (b) 
can matter play that role only as much as it relates to each opposite in a different 
way? To be more precise on option (b), (i) does matter relate to the (positive) 
form resulting from its change according to its dispositional property and its very 
form (καθ' ἕξιν καὶ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος, 1044b32-33), whereas, on the contrary, (ii) 
matter relates to the (negative) state resulting from change only according to the 
privation and the corruption (of the own former dispositional properties actual-
ized in the compound) (κατὰ στέρησιν καὶ φθορὰν, 1044b33)? 
Interestingly enough, Aristotle does not fully develop or solve this diffi-
culty in the present chapter.100 However, H4’s theory about constituent proper 
matter provides us with adequate means to settle this question in favor of op-
tion (b). This is so because Aristotle has already shown that, as far as the mate-
rial substrate is a constituent part of the compound and in order for it to be so, 
matter cannot be “undifferentiated,” similarly to the indeterminate residual sub-
strate reached after having eliminated all properties and dispositions from a 
given thing in the thought experiment of Z3, it can be potentially the thing 
that matter generates only according to its (i.e. of the matter) dispositional 
properties. Yet, if there must be a continuity also in substantial change, and 
granting that this continuity can be guaranteed only by assuming one and the 
same matter for the opposites, then Aristotle must give an account of how could 
one and the same matter be the subject of change between the opposites. More 
precisely, he must explain how it is possible that one and the same matter is the 
subject of the negative state that results from the corruption of the previous 
positive state (as in the case of corpse that comes from the corruption of a living 
body).  
Aristotle assumes that the matter required for grounding the necessary 
continuity of change is, on the one hand, one and the same matter. But, in order 
to explain the double role played by (one and the same) matter as the subject of 
opposites, he must add that, on the other hand, such a matter can be the subject 
of change only in that its dispositional properties i.e. those dispositional prop-
erties that were realized in the positive state have been already corrupted. 
Inasmuch as these properties were those defining the matter as constituent for 
the positive state for example, grape juice for wine, after matter has suffered 
the radical change that gives rise to vinegar, it must have already lost its proper 
features. That is why Aristotle can describe the condition of matter when it is 
the subject of the (negative) opposite as having properties that are contrary to 
its (previous) nature (as constituent for the positive state, i.e. wine) (παρὰ 
φύσιν, 104b34). Following one of Aristotle’s examples, water can be the subject 
-------------------------------------------- 
100 For an analysis, see Code (unpublished). 
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of vinegar only in that water’s dispositional properties actualized as constituent 
part of wine have been already corrupted. 
In order to better grasp the different conditions in which one and the same 
matter must be subject of opposites in substantial change, we can make the 
following distinctions. A subject can be the material cause of a product that is 
the result of the specification of the matters’ dispositional properties as it is 
water or grape juice for wine only if that subject is in a certain condition, 
mF,101 in which it is in potentiality the same as the form of the product that 
results from the matter’s actualization. This is the matter fully specified by the 
form (F) (wine) as a constituent part of the compound (τοῦ μὲν καθ' ἕξιν καὶ 
κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ὕλη, 1044b32-33). But after a radical change, the same matter can 
become mC102 under another specification, i.e. under the specification provided 
by the opposite form (G), which makes matter be in a different condition. In this 
latter condition, the matter mC is potentially the same as G (vinegar), and so mC 
gives rise to a product that is the result of the corruption of its (i.e. matter’s) 
previous dispositional properties (κατὰ στέρησιν καὶ φθορὰν, 1044b33) actual-
ized in the (positive) compound. 
In 1045a3-5, we read that things that change into one another (μεταβάλλει 
εἰς ἄλληλα, 1045a3-4), such as wine and vinegar or living body and corpse, can-
not share exactly the same matter and use them immediately as their subject. 
The matter of corpse can be the matter of a living body only if the matter re-
turns (is split up) into some lower matter that can develop (as a result of a spec-
ifying process) the dispositional properties that are necessary to generate the 
living body i.e. those dispositional properties that cannot be immediately pro-
vided by the matter of a corpse being in the condition it is, since, in the above 
introduced terms, mC is specified contrarily to mF. This is also implied in Aristo-
tle’s rejection of ἄμφω δυνάμει in 1044b31: one and the same matter cannot be 
potentially both opposites immediately and in the same condition. Consequently, 
Aristotle there favors the alternative (b) that consists in accepting two different 
specifications of (one and the same) matter, i.e. according to the form and accord-
ing to privation (1044b32-34).103 
H5’s difficult lines 1044b34-36 introduce the second (and subsidiary) 
aporia (1044b34-1045a6), which further elaborates on the distinction between 
constituent and preexisting matter. It deals with the change of one thing into 
another (1045a3-4), already mentioned here above, and its main question is how 
one opposite relates to the other one in substantial change. The means for its 
solution are already at our disposal. One opposite cannot be made of the other’s 
proximate matter. Thus, even though corpse and living body can come one from 
-------------------------------------------- 
101 To be read as “matter for form.” 
102 To be read as “matter of the corruption.” 
103 Bostock 1994, 277f provides a different interpretation. 
  F. MIÉ  -  REFINING THE MATERIAL SUBSTANCE  94 
SÍNTESIS. REVISTA DE FILOSOFÍA I (2) 2018; pp. 54-100 e-ISSN: 2452-4476 
the other (remember schema (2) of H4), the constituent matter of each of them 
cannot be the matter of which the other is immediately made (οὐδὲ δυνάμει ὄξος 
(καίτοι γίγνεται ἐξ αὐτοῦ ὄξος), 1044b35-36). In 1045a3-5, Aristotle makes it 
explicit that the decomposition of a compound in its matter results in its preex-
isting matter; and this is like a precondition under which it is possible to get a 
new suitable stuff i.e. the same matter under a different condition for the 
opposite: 
 
And those things, then, that change into one another in this way 
must revert to their matters; for instance, if an animal comes from 
a corpse, <the corpse must revert> to its matter, first, and then it 
can become an animal <from this matter> in this way; and similarly 
does vinegar that <must revert, first,> to water, and then, in this 
way, <it can become> wine. (1045a3-6) 
 
The decomposition (ἐπανελθεῖν: to go back, to return, to revert, to be reduced) 
in 1045a4 is now explained as a constraint to undergo the reciprocal change 
between opposites;104 and the process of reciprocal change between compounds 
must be understood in terms of the splitting up of a compound into its matter 
(τῷ ἀναλύεσθαι εἰς τὴν ὕλην), as it is said in 1044a22-23 (according to schema 
(2) in H4). 
The controversial lines in which Aristotle presents his second (and 
subsidiary) aporia of the chapter deserve a special consideration. Let me start 
quoting them in a translation: 
 
There is also a certain difficulty over why it is that wine is not 
matter of vinegar, nor is it potentially vinegar (even though vinegar 
comes from it), and similarly the animal is not potentially a corpse. 
Or <this is> not <a difficulty>, but rather corruptions occur by ac-
cident, and the matter of the animal is also, according to <its> 
corruption, itself the matter that is the potency of a corpse, and 
water <similarly> in relation to vinegar. (1044b34-1045a2)105 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
104 Aristotle seems to limit the cases in which reciprocal change occurs between 
opposites (see οὐ πάντα ἂν τἀναντία γίγνοιτο ἐξ ἀλλήλων, 1044b24-25). According to 
Alexander 1891, 560, 4-15, since nothing involves its own destruction, wine cannot be 
potentially vinegar; wine’s destruction is rather the result of being deprived of its own form. 
See also Ross 1924, II 236f. Bostock 1994, 278 rejects Aristotle’s apparent claim that the 
destructions occur by accident (but see the discussion on this point here below). Detel 2009, 626 
also stresses that losing its own form is accidental for a thing. 
105 I here borrow both from Ross’s and Bostock’s translations (with some modifications). 
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The general model above suggested for grasping Aristotle’s examples is as fol-
lows: the matter of wine cannot be immediately the matter of vinegar although 
it must be in a way vinegar’s matter, as Aristotle claims here in 1045a1-2: ἡ δὲ 
τοῦ ζῴου ὕλη αὐτὴ κατὰ φθορὰν νεκροῦ δύναμις καὶ ὕλη. Water or grape juice, 
taken as the matter of wine, are its proximate stuff and constituent part; there-
fore, this high specification makes it unsuitable to perform opposite functions. 
This is less dramatic, but not different, only when the opposite is, like in the 
example of corpse, something deprived of any function. However, at the same 
time, since vinegar comes from wine (and wine from vinegar), they must share 
some lower preexisting matter that guarantees that the matter of one opposite 
can also be the matter of the other one. This is horizontal unity in substantial 
change. But the lower matter is certainly not the proximate one of either of them 
otherwise, the vertical unity of compounds would be severely damaged by 
having assumed that each compound is made of an insufficiently specified mat-
ter. 
So, under the here sketched model, we can analyze the text as follows. (i) 
The constituent matter of wine (in the condition it is, i.e. as being highly specified 
as the potential matter of wine) cannot be the potential matter of vinegar. This 
means that, let us say, grape juice (i.e. the constituent material part of wine) is 
neither the constituent matter of its opposite (vinegar) nor, as such, vinegar in 
potentiality (ὁ οἶνος οὐχ ὕλη τοῦ ὄξους οὐδὲ δυνάμει ὄξος, 1044b34-35). Thus, 
the constituent matter of wine as such is not the constituent matter of vinegar; 
nor can it be vinegar in potentiality. (ii) This may present a difficulty, as I have 
already said, because wine and vinegar originate from the other as it is stressed 
by Aristotle in the formulation of the difficulty by means of the concessive 
clause καίτοι γίγνεται ἐξ αὐτοῦ ὄξος (1044b35-36). But as soon as we see things 
closer the difficulty disappears. This is what Aristotle goes on to suggest in ἢ 
οὔ, ἀλλὰ … (1044b36). So we get his own solution: (iii) we have to think of 
corruptions as something that happens by accident (κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἱ 
φθοραί, 1044b36-1045a1), since they are not possible as to what the constituent 
matter is by itself. This does not mean that corruptions are accidental changes, 
perhaps like alterations or quality changes. We already know from other trea-
tises that Aristotle considers substantial change as much more radical than 
accidental change, since the former, unlike to the latter, involves a change in 
the very subject. In the lines 1045a1-2 (ἡ δὲ τοῦ ζῴου ὕλη αὐτὴ κατὰ φθορὰν 
νεκροῦ δύναμις καὶ ὕλη, καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ ὄξους·), he explains that (iv) in order to 
be the subject of substantial change (between wine and vinegar), some matter 
must change radically, i.e. the highly specified matter of wine must be deprived 
of its proper features as constituent of wine, and, only after having returned to 
a condition of lower specification, the same matter under a different specification 
can be in potentiality the subject of the opposite, i.e. vinegar. Finally, (v) it is 
possible to say that corruptions occur by accident (κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς), inasmuch 
  F. MIÉ  -  REFINING THE MATERIAL SUBSTANCE  96 
SÍNTESIS. REVISTA DE FILOSOFÍA I (2) 2018; pp. 54-100 e-ISSN: 2452-4476 
as the constituent matter of the compound of origin (wine) can be the matter of 
the opposite (vinegar) only by being deprived of all its proper features (κατὰ 
φθορὰν). Thus, the matter of wine is not by itself the matter of vinegar, but 
rather only by accident, i.e. in that its dispositional properties as constituent part 
of wine are corrupted. 
 
11. FINAL REMARKS: A FLASHBACK TO THE “SHALE” OF H1-5 
Gill spots that in H4-5 Aristotle is still trapped in a problem. Accordingly, in 
vinegar, water (i.e. the matter of wine that has passed-away) remains as some-
thing determinate and actually existing; this gives rise, lastly, to Gill’s diagnosis 
about the compound’s lack of unity.106 When considering these things, how-
ever, it seems more plausible to think that H4-5 provide important evidence 
against this sort of interpretation, since precisely the discussion of the second 
aporia of H5 strongly suggests that we must rather not take water as persisting 
through change with all its constituent features. Water remains through the sub-
stantial change from wine into vinegar only in that its constituent features (as 
wine’s matter) are corrupted (ἡ […] ὕλη αὐτὴ κατὰ φθορὰν) (together with 
wine’s passing away). This means that the water supplied with the specific 
features that made it the matter of wine (wine’s constituent stuff) does not 
persist through change. So from this we cannot infer, as Gill does, that the 
actual water which would build an independent layer within the compound 
is (constituent) part of vinegar. In order to guarantee continuity Aristotle does 
not need to assume such a complete matter at a lower layer within the material 
compound (or within the opposites involved in change); it may be enough for 
him to allow certain dispositional properties (necessarily located at a lower level 
of specification) to remain crossing and connecting the opposites. Otherwise, 
he would only get an accidental unity for material substances: a unity between 
a matter that is complete and independent, on the one hand, and a form that 
must be superimposed, on the other. This, evidently, cannot square with H6’s 
unity thesis (1045b17-19).107 
To conclude, I may take a brief look back at H1-5’s developmental path 
and now get a picture of the complex figures we have observed in their fabric 
of material substance. Contrarily to the common view on H1-5 that finds in 
-------------------------------------------- 
106 Gill 1996, 225ff. 
107 To explain that thesis, Detel 2009, 623ff adds an important improvement to Gill’s 
“construction model,” for he suggests that there is a partial identity between matter and form. 
This helps to avoid both plain identity and a mere coincidental identity. See Detel 2009, 199f: 
“Wie nach den Analysen in VII 12 und VIII 2-5 bereits festeht, bilden allgemeine Form-Materie-
Komposita eine Einheit, weil die Formen der Materie die Disposition aufweisen, von einer 
höheren Form geprägt und spezialisiert zu werden, und weil ferner diese Spezialisierung 
tatsächlich vorliegt und damit die Form des Kompositums und die Form der Materie essentiell 
zusammenhängen.” 
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these chapters little more than sparse notes on several topics of book Z, I have 
tried to show that, after a careful observation, these chapters are the argumen-
tative chain linking Z17’s innovative thesis to H6’s revolutionary solution. Both 
extremes are bound together in that Z17’s thesis on form as cause is refined in 
H6’s thesis about the identity of the actual form and the potential matter. The 
very point of departure of these inquiries in Z17’s etiological approach is spread 
onto H1-5, where form and matter are constantly dyed by this coloring they 
are examined as causes, and so the main problems raised in these chapters con-
cern the explanatory priority of form (H2-3) as well as the identification of the 
matter that properly constitute and explains the compound’s performance (H4-
5).108 Instead of considering H1-5 as mere miscellaneous notes on Z, or instead 
of reducing the significance of the entire book to a few triumphant lines in H6 
that solve all problems at one stroke, we must better go back to H1-5 for argu-
mentative details that can be part of a larger program. A rich shale is then re-
vealed, in which Aristotle works in his fabric of material substance by fueling 
Z17’s etiological approach with a fine-grained argumentation whose contribu-
tion is far from being exhausted by the modal translation109 (i.e. potentiality for 




108 “In short, Z17 is a continuous presence in H, which reads well as a development of 
the discussion freshly started there.” Burnyeat 2001, 73. 
109 Certainly, as we cannot repeat often enough (see, for instance, Morel 2015, 12, 23 
(passim) and Burnyeat 2001, 74, 76). 
110 This paper was written with the support of two generous foreign institutions: the 
Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung (from which I received a generous fellowship between 2012 
and 2015 to work out a project on Aristotle’s hylomorphism in the Metaphysics) and the 
Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst during happy stays at the University of Munich 
(LMU). I warmly thank my host in Munich, Prof. Dr. Christof Rapp, for his support, comments 
and advice in seminars and talks. I also had the opportunity to discuss in Munich on Metaphysics 
Z and H with Dr. Christian Pfeiffer, whom I am very grateful. For the long and constant 
exchange of ideas on these topics, I owe a lot to my friend and host at the Universidad de los 
Andes (Santiago de Chile), Prof. Dr. Jorge Mittelmann. The Universidad de los Andes continues 
funding our multiannual cooperation. A Spanish shorter version of this paper was read as 
inaugural conference at the 5th Congress of the Latin-American Association of Ancient 
Philosophy (ALFA) at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro in September 2017, and sections 
of previous drafts were also presented at the Universidad de los Andes during my stays there 
in 2016 and 2017. In March 2017 I was invited to lecture on Metaphysics H in the Doctoral 
Program of the Università degli Studi di Macerata (Italy). To all these friendly audiences and 
the sharp questions they raised I am deeply indebted. I also thank my colleague in Santa Fe, 
Manuel Berrón, for the long-standing work together on these and other Aristotelian topics. My 
work is supported in my country by CONICET and two projects funded by the Agencia 
Nacional de Promoción Científica y Tecnológica (PICT 2016-2128) and the Universidad 
Nacional del Litoral (CAI+D 2016-PI 5012015010062LI). Last, but not least, I warmly thank the 
Editor of this volume, Prof. Dr. Gabriela Rossi, for her patience and comments, and to the 
anonymous referees for useful suggestions. For her help with the English I also thank María 
Inés Fidalgo (CONICET-Universidad Nacional del Litoral). Of course, all remaining mistakes are 
my own. 
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